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A CHECK ON EXCESS: COURT PUTS RARE HARNESS ON FINES
The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC)
July 4, 1998
James J. Kilpatrick
The Supreme Court ordinarily proceeds with the deliberation of Percherons pulling a beer truck. Now
and then, to the pleasure of the press corps, one of the justices jumps the traces and surprises us all. This
was the case on June 22 when the court gave a break to Hosep Bajakajian.
On the surface the facts seemed damning. Bajakajian, his wife and two daughters were waiting at Los
Angeles International Airport for a flight that would take them to Italy, thence to Cyprus. Trained dogs
sniffed the family baggage, and behold: The bags contained $230,000 in U.S. currency. A further search
turned up another $127,000, much of it in a suitcase with a false bottom.
Customs agents seized the currency and charged Bajakajian with violating a federal law against
smuggling. It is not against the law to take $357,000 out of the country, but it is against the law if one
fails to report it. The government demanded that the whole sum be forfeited to the Treasury.
At trial in U.S. District Court, it developed that the defendant had told agents a pack of lies. He said
a friend named Abe Ajemian had lent him $200,000. Abe denied it. Bajakajian said Saeed Faroutan had
lent him $170,000. Saeed denied it. The best Bajakajian could say in his own defense was that as a
member of the Armenian minority in Syria, he had developed a pervasive fear and distrust of
government.
A weaker defense never was offered in the history of criminal law, but clearly it made an impression
on the trial court. The judge concluded the defendant had not amassed the money illegally; there was no
evidence of money laundering; the defendant was not a crook, he was only a respectable businessman,
the owner of a prosperous filling station, who was on his way to Syria to pay a business debt.
Thus the trial court refused to impose a total forfeiture. The court imposed a forfeiture of $15,000 and
a fine of $5,000, plus three years on probation. The government appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit affirmed the sentence. The government went to the Supreme Court, where the token
forfeiture once again was affirmed on June 22.
It was a historic moment. Since he came on the high court seven years ago, Justice Clarence Thomas
has served as a kind of Percheron conservative. In writing a majority opinion, until this day, he never had
found himself in a jurisprudential bed with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg. But there he
was. You wonder if they all hated themselves in the morning.
156
The decision was notable in another way. The Supreme Court does not sit to remedy individual
problems of injustice. That is not its function. The high court's primary duty is to resolve large questions
of constitutional and statutory law. In Bajakajian's case, the Supremes had to interpret the Eighth
Amendment prohibiting the imposition of "excessive" fines. Remarkably, this had never been done
before.
What is "excessive"? It is whatever five members of the high court say it is, and neither more nor less.
The meaning "involves solely a proportionality determination." Thomas and his colleagues found that
a total forfeiture of $357,000 would be "grossly disproportional" to the gravity of Bajakajian's offense.
In sum, the court majority concluded that a total forfeiture would be - what? It would be unjust - and
that is the interesting thing, because the justices are rarely concerned with injustice. They are concerned
with law, and law and justice often are total strangers.
Justice Anthony Kennedy is ordinarily a sober fellow, not much given to raising his voice. This time
he hollered:
"For the first time in its history, the court strikes down a fine as excessive under the Eighth
Amendment. The decision is disturbing both for its specific holding and for the broader upheaval it
foreshadows. ... It portends serious disruption of a vast range of statutory fines. The court all but says
the offense is not serious anyway. This disdain for the statute is wrong as an empirical matter and
disrespectful of the separation of powers."
My inclination would be to say to Justice Kennedy, there, there, Tony, it's not that bad. The
determination of an "excessive" fine cannot present a more difficult constitutional problem than the
determination of an "unreasonable" search. What is "appropriate" legislation? When is a trial "speedy"?
What law "abridges" freedom of speech? Who knows? The high court knows.
In the case at hand, I have a notion that brother Bajakajian got off pretty easy, but I doubt that any
earth-shaking precedent has been set. Justice Thomas kicked up those Percheron heels. Three days later
he was back in the stable again. Hooray!
Kilpatrick is a Universal Press Syndicate columnist who lives in Charleston.
Copyright 1998 The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC)
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FORFEITURE OF CASH AT LAX STRUCK DOWN
Los Angeles Times
June 23, 1998, Home Edition
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
Four years ago, a Hollywood service station owner went to Los Angeles International Airport with
$357,144 hidden in his luggage--determined, he said, to prevent the money from being stolen by corrupt
customs officials when he arrived in his native Syria. Instead, he has spent the years since fighting to get
the money back from U.S. officials who seized and kept it.
On Monday, he triumphed before the nation's highest court, winning a potentially landmark ruling that
rebuked the government and ordered his money refunded.
The government's claim to Hosep K. Bajakajian's money, under currency forfeiture laws, amounts to
a grossly excessive fine for a minor paperwork offense, said Justice Clarence Thomas for the court. The
5-4 ruling marked the first time the Supreme Court has struck down a forfeiture as unconstitutional.
Told of the news at his service station Monday morning, Bajakajian said it affirned his faith in the U.S.
justice system.
"This is great news. It makes my eyes fill up," he said in a phone interview. "I believe in God, injustice
and the United States."
His attorney, James E. Blatt of Encino, was equally elated. "This has been a very long battle. The
Customs Service went overboard in taking Mr. Bajakajian's money and we're thrilled the Supreme Court
agreed."
Bajakajian's troubles are not over, however. A $5,000 fine and $15,000 forfeiture will be deducted
before the money is returned, and the Internal Revenue Service has notified him that it thinks he
underreported his income by an amount similar to that seized.
The ruling, however, may rein in the government's heretofore unchecked power in forfeiture cases.
Over the last decade, forfeitures have become a powerful weapon in the war on drugs. Police and
prosecutors have seized houses, boats, bank accounts and businesses owned by drug dealers.
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But many others have loudly complained that these government seizures can be unfair and excessive.
At times, people have lost a house or a business because they or friends or family members have been
involved in minor drug offenses, such as growing marijuana in their backyards.
In the past, the Supreme Court has said a forfeiture might be so extreme as to violate the 8th
Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines." But until Monday, the court had
never declared a seizure unconstitutional.
The case of the Hollywood gas station owner seemed to illustrate a government zeal that offended,
in turn, a federal judge in Los Angeles, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco and now
the Supreme Court.
It began on June 9, 1994, when Bajakajian went to the Los Angeles airport with his wife and two
children and planned to fly to Syria. Family members had helped him get started in business in Los
Angeles and, he said, he was taking money there to repay his debts.
A drug-sniffing dog detected the hidden currency, and customs agents stopped Bajakajian from
boarding the flight. Though he denied having the money at first, he later admitted that it was his.
He was charged with violating the currency reporting law. People who move at least $10,000 of
currency into or out of the United States must file a report. Passengers arriving on international flights
are given reporting forms before landing. Those who are leaving the country are not similarly notified.
Congress passed the law in 1970 to try to nab organized crime bosses and drug traffickers who moved
large amounts of cash. The law remains on the books and is not directly affected by the high court ruling,
which pertained only to the "excessive" amount of the forfeiture in Bajakajian's case.
Brought before U.S. District Judge John G. Davies in Los Angeles, Bajakajian was able to show that
his money was obtained lawfully and was not tainted by crime. The judge imposed a $5,000 fine and a
forfeiture of $15,000. Any further forfeiture would be "extraordinarily harsh," Davies said. He ordered
the rest of the money returned. It was not clear whether the government will pay Bajakajian interest, his
lawyer said.
But the U.S. attorney's office in Los Angeles appealed, arguing that the government was entitled to
keep the entire amount. The 9th Circuit Court disagreed, but the Justice Department appealed again. All
"undeclared cash that is brought into or taken out of the this country is subject to forfeiture," the Clinton
administration asserted in its appeal in the case (United States vs. Bajakajian, 96-1487).
Thomas, in Monday's ruling, wrote that the gas station owner "is not a money launderer, a drug
trafficker or a tax evader." A "full forfeiture of Bajakajian's cash would be grossly disproportional to the
gravity of his offense" and, therefore, unconstitutional.
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The ruling marked a rare instance in which Thomas joined with the court's more liberal members--John
Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer--to rule against the
government. At his nomination, friends said Thomas had a libertarian streak, but it had not been evident
until Monday.
"Money launderers will rejoice" at the decision, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said in dissent. He was
joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia.
Although the ruling returns Bajakajian's money--minus the $5,000 fine and the $15,000 forfeiture
ordered by the district court judge in Los Angeles--his legal fees have been "substantial," according to
Blatt, his lawyer. But Blatt declined to specify the exact costs.
Nor are Bajakajian's tussles with the government over.
Soon after his case was argued in the Supreme Court, he received a notice from the Internal Revenue
Service saying he owed $334,000 in back taxes and penalties for 1994.
Former Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark A. Byrne, who is representing him in the tax matter, said the
IRS move is questionable. He added that it seemed "unbelievably coincidental" that the IRS was seeking
roughly the same amount involved in the forfeiture case.
Copyright 1998 Times Mirror Company
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UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ
Legal Times
July 13, 1998, Monday
Paul Butler
Early one morning someone sneaks up to your house, breaks a window in the attached garage, and
waves a gun through the window. What would you think?
When that happened at the house where Hernan Ramirez, his wife, and their three-year-old child were
sleeping, Ramirez thought that his home was being burglarized. He ran to a closet, grabbed a pistol, and
fired at the ceiling of the garage in an effort to scare off whoever was seeking to invade his home. The
intruders--there were approximately 45 armed men and women outside-- announced that they were the
police and began shooting into the house.
When Ramirez realized it was the government, and not criminals, that had broken into his home, he
ran into the living room, threw the pistol on the floor, and lay down in a prone position. He was shaking
with fright. The police entered the house and took Mr. Ramirez, Mrs. Ramirez, and their child into
custody.
It turned out that the police were executing an arrest warrant. But the warrant was not for Ramirez
or his wife or his child, but rather for Alan Shelby, an escaped fugitive. Someone had told an officer of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that he had seen Shelby at Ramirez's house. The person
with this information was described as a confidential informant, so we have no way of knowing who he
was. We know that the police did not find Shelby at the Ramirez residence. Nor did they find the cache
of guns in Ramirez's garage that the informant claimed he had heard were there. We know that prior to
breaking into Ramirez's home, the police had no probable cause to implicate him in any crime.
But when 45 law enforcement agents, including three SWAT teams, break into your home at 6:30 in
the morning, there is a possibility that the government will learn something about you that it did not
previously know. And so the government learned that Ramirez had a gun.
Two guns, actually. Ramirez admitted it when he, his wife, and child were ordered out of their home
on that morning. And because Ramirez had, some time ago, been convicted of a felony, it was illegal for
him to possess a gun. So the agents obtained another warrant to search Ramirez's home, this time for
two guns, which the agents found right where he had told them they would be. Ramirez was
subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms.
At trial, Ramirez sought to suppress the guns on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure. Although the trial judge and
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a federal appellate court agreed and suppressed the evidence, the Supreme Court disagreed. In United
States v. Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. 992 (March 4, 1998), the Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the actions
of the police. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote that the police conduct was "clearly reasonable and
we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation."
Little Castle
The issue in Ramirez is, in the dry parlance of criminal procedure, whether " no-knock" execution of
search warrants must meet a higher standard when entry results in destruction of property. To Ramirez,
and perhaps to you, the issue is how much information the government needs to have before it is allowed
to kick down your door and enter and search your home.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in affirming the trial court's suppression of Ramirez's
guns, ruled that the Fourth Amendment requires more than a "mild exigency" before the police may
destroy property when they execute a search warrant. Judge Ferdinand Fernandez, joined by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, described the home as every person's "little castle" and the "last real retreat in this
technological age." Thus,
the fear of a smashing in of doors by government agents is based upon much more than a concern
that our privacy will be disturbed. It is based upon concern for our safety and the safety of our
families. Indeed, the minions of dictators do not kick in doors for the mere purpose of satisfying
some voyeuristic desire to peer around and then go about their business. Something much more
malevolent and dangerous is afoot when they take those actions. It is that which strikes terror into
the hearts of their victims. The Fourth Amendment protects us from that fear as much as it
protects our privacy.
Accordingly, the 9th Circuit required a higher standard for no-knock entries in which the police must
break windows or ram doors, and ruled that the higher standard was not satisfied on the Ramirez facts.
Judge Alex Kozinski wrote a scathing dissent, castigating Judges Fernandez and Reinhardt's "cheap"
words and "high-fallutin rhetoric." He did not quarrel with the higher standard established for destructive
entries, but thought that the standard was satisfied here, based on the dangerousness of the felon whom
the police originally sought to apprehend. He also contended that the 9th Circuit precedent had found
exigent circumstances in less extreme situations.
Kozinski agreed with the principle of the "sanctity of every man's little castle, " but opined that "the
principal reason we can sleep safely at night is that the men and women of law enforcement put their
lives on the line to keep our castles from being invaded by brutal criminals." It was easy for the court,
sitting in its "well-guarded offices, and with the benefit of hindsight, to issue pronouncements about what
the police should or could have done, " but the Constitution demands mere reasonableness, and the
police acted entirely properly. "To have done less would have been foolhardy, to have done more would
have been excessive."
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It must be kind of fun to be Alex Kozinski, a conservative judge sitting in a relatively liberal circuit that
is subject to review by a conservative Supreme Court. You're not allowed to actually pick up the
telephone, and call Nino and Clarence, and say, "You'll never guess what these half-brains have done
now." That would be too easy, anyway. The sport is in ending your dissents with words like these:
"Opinions like the majority's lend support to the notion that the Ninth Circuit is not a single court but
a series of disaggregated panels whose judges are guided by their predilections rather than precedent.
Because I cannot join in this wholesale flouting of circuit authority, I dissent." And you know your boys
in Washington are going to come through for you.
To explain its reversal of the 9th Circuit decision, the Supreme Court's opinion begins, as the lower
court's did, with a story, but it is the story of Shelby, the fleeing felon, and not that of Ramirez, the not-
so-innocent homeowner.
In 1994, Shelby was being transported to an Oregon courthouse to give testimony when he slipped
his handcuffs, punched a deputy sheriff, and absconded. He had been facing a sentence of 248 months
and had reportedly stated that he would "not do federal time." Shelby had attempted escape several times
before, and during these attempts had assaulted a woman, had stolen an automobile, and "was reported
to have made threats to kill witnesses and police officers." Justice Rehnquist noted, "It was also thought
that Shelby had had access to large supplies of weapons."
Based on these contentions (one hesitates to call them facts since they are largely unsupported by
evidence, and the other "facts" about Shelby's whereabouts turned out to be wrong), Rehnquist found
that the police were correct in reasonably suspecting that Shelby posed a threat to their safety when they
executed the search warrant. But is "reasonable suspicion" the correct standard for determining when
the government is allowed to burst unannounced through one's door?
In the last few years, the Supreme Court has been deciding knock-and-announce cases at about the
rate of one each term. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Court reversed the Arkansas
Supreme Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment never requires police officers to knock and
announce their presence when executing a search warrant. Last year, in Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S.
Ct. 1416 (1997), the Court overturned the Wisconsin Supreme Court's determination that officers
executing search warrants in felony drug cases never have to knock and announce first. The Court stated
that "in order to justify a no knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile."
While both Wilson and Richards ostensibly supported the knock-and-announce requirement, they left
room for exceptions based on exigent circumstances-- for example, danger to the police. But because
the standard for determining exigency is so low--"reasonable suspicion, " as opposed to the traditional
criminal law requirement of "probable cause"--the exception seems likely to devour the rule. Considering
that this issue arises only when police wish to search places where they believe there are criminals or
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evidence of crimes, any police officer worth her salt should be able to make a case that she reasonably
fears for her safety, and thus circumvent the knock-and-announce requirement. Never mind that this
requirement has been a fixture of Anglo- American jurisprudence since the 13th century.
An Exception to the Exception
Perhaps in anticipation of the weakening of the knock-and-announce rule (the 9th Circuit decided
Ramirez prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Richards) , the 9th Circuit tried to carve out an
exception to the exception. It required heightened scrutiny of exigent circumstances in cases in which
police destroy property. But Justice Rehnquist, while not as harsh as Judge Kozinski, wrote that it is
"obvious from the holdings" in Wilson and Richards that destructive police searches are subject to the
same standard as any other government search.
That the Court's decision in Ramirez is "obvious" based on its earlier cases is true, but it is also
troubling. Given the minimal requirements of " reasonable suspicion, " the officers had sufficient cause
to believe that the fleeing felon posed a danger to them, even if their information was not particularly
strong or credible. Yet "probable cause" remains the standard for police determination of exigency
outside the knock-and-announce context. The ironic result is that, on the issue of how sure the police
must be before they search in an emergency, one's "little castle" is afforded less constitutional protection
than one's automobile or purse.
So the law is simply that if the police have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would
expose them to danger, they may barge right in, eliminating whatever windows or doors happen to be
in their way. And the 9th Circuit is out of touch with modern law enforcement and its embrace of zero
tolerance and three strikes. The fact is that no other circuit and only two states have chosen to impose
higher standards for search warrants that result in the destruction of property.
Ultimately, we may decide that the Fourth Amendment is also out of touch. (It is a commonplace
among criminal law professors that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement would have a tough
time making it through Congress today; as for the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination-
-forget about it.) There is no question that the Fourth Amendment impedes law enforcement. It would
indeed be easier to enforce the criminal law if police were not required to act reasonably.
The 9th Circuit's opinion in Ramirez noted, optimistically, that the "flame of our Fourth Amendment
liberties is bright and strong, " but cautioned, " Still, it is just a flame, and it will be quickly quenched if
it is not protected." It is an overstatement to say that the Supreme Court's decision is that quick
quenching. But Wilson begat Richards begat Ramirez. What will Ramirez beget?
Copyright 1998 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
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POLICE GET BROADER SEARCH LEEWAY
The Legal Intelligencer
March 05, 1998
Laurie Asseo, Associated Press
Washington Police with search warrants do not need extra justification to enter a home without
knocking first even if the entry results in property damage, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday.
The unanimous ruling allows prosecutors to use as evidence weapons seized from an Oregon man's
home after police broke a window while making a no-knock entry.
The high court previously has ruled that police with search warrants can enter someone's home without
knocking if they have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing themselves would be
dangerous or harm the investigation.
"Whether such a reasonable suspicion exists depends in no way on whether police must destroy
property in order to enter," Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote for the court.
However, Rehnquist said such entries still are governed by the Constitution's Fourth Amendment ban
on unreasonable searches.
"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth
Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful," the chief justice wrote.
But the court upheld the 1994 search of Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Ore.
Police came to his home on a tip that an escaped inmate may have been there. Officials said the inmate
struck a guard, stole a vehicle and threatened to kill police officers and others.
The 45 officers arrived early in the morning and announced over a loudspeaker that they had a search
warrant. Without waiting for a response, one officer broke a garage window and began waving a gun
through the window.
Ramirez said he and his wife thought they were being burglarized He got a gun and fired it into the
ceiling, but surrendered when he realized the window was broken by police.
The escaped inmate was not found, but police got a new search warrant and seized two guns. Ramirez
was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
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A federal judge ruled the search unlawful, saying officers' knowledge of the escaped inmate's violent
past justified entering Ramirez's home without knocking, but only if they could do it without damaging
his property.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling, but the Supreme Court disagreed.
The police officers' conduct in breaking into Ramirez's home was "clearly reasonable," the chief justice
said.
"The police here broke a single window in (Ramirez's) garage" because they wanted to keep the
house's occupants from grabbing weapons that an informant had said were inside, Rehnquist wrote.
Copyright 1998 Legal Communications, Ltd.
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KNOWLES v. IOWA
By Darren Welch
Imagine being pulled over for a simple speeding ticket and being subjected to a full-blown,
suspicionless search of your person and your car. This is legal in Iowa, and this coming term the
Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of the law which authorizes such a search.
Iowa Code section 805.1(4) confers upon police officers the authority to search the driver and the
interior of her car when a traffic violation has occurred that would constitute grounds for an arrest.
Iowa is the only state to offer such broad authority to its police officers. This authority was upheld in
State v. Doran (Iowa 1997). The Doran court noted that ensuring officer safety is a legitimate public
policy reason for granting police officers such authority.
On March 9, 1996, Defendant Patrick Knowles was pulled over for speeding. The officer checked
Knowles' drivers license and found no outstanding warrants. The officer then searched the interior of
Knowles' car. Under the drivers seat the officer found a pipe and some marijuana. Knowles was later
convicted of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance and keeping a controlled substance in an
automobile. Knowles challenged evidenciary rulings that permitted the marujuana to be introduced
against him.
The conviction was affirmed in the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Knowles. Justice Carter's
majority opinion summarily disposed of Knowles arguments as precluded by the Doran ruling and recited
officer safety as a legitimate purpose for the statute. Carter also noted that Knowles did not contest that
he was speeding or that there was a statutory basis for an arrest.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question "whether the Fourth Amendment allows a state
to enact a statute conferring blanket authority to the police to conduct a full-blown search of a vehicle
upon issuance of a traffic or equipment citation?"
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), joined by the Iowa Civil Liberties Union and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of
petitioner Knowles. They argue that the statute unconstitutionally authorizes "unreasonable" searches,
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. No probable cause exists for the search, and the "search incident
to arrest" exception is not invoked upon mere issuance of a traffic citation. The brief suggests that the
Terry doctrine allows only a patdown, to ensure officer safety when an individual is detained, not a full-
blown search. Furthermore, the ACLU brief argues that the statute fails a balancing test, because the
violation of personal privacy is severe and should only be justified by probable cause.
The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) has filed an amicus brief in favor of the
respondent, the state of Iowa. The NAPO brief stresses the need for police safety during unpredictable,
potentially dangerous traffic stops. The NAPO brief also asserts that the number of arrests when
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citations would suffice will increase, and that police officers should be afforded the same rights to search
when they opt for a less intrusive citation.
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NATIONAL ASSN. OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS FILES AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF TO
U.S. SUPREME COURT
U.S. Newswire
June 29, 1998
WASHINGTON, June 29 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Today, the National Association of Police
Organizations, Inc. (NAPO), representing more than 4,000 police unions and associations and over
220,000 sworn law enforcement officers from across the nation, submitted a legal brief in support of law
enforcement officers in the case of Patrick Knowles v. State of Iowa, a Fourth Amendment vehicular
search and seizure case.
This case directly bears on the authority of law enforcement officers to protect themselves and the
public by conducting a search for weapons, whenever they stop a motor vehicle for a traffic violation
and issue a citation instead of making an arrest (assuming there is authority to do both). NAPO and its
members have a significant interest in the resolution of this case. The Iowa State Police Association is
a member of NAPO, with approximately 3,000 police officer members, whose safety during traffic stops
will be impacted by the Court's decision. In addition, NAPO is vitally concerned with the impact that
this case will have on the safety of law enforcement officers throughout the nation. NAPO's amicus brief
provides the Court with the perspective of the police profession and an insight into the serious danger
inherent in routine traffic stops.
BACKGROUND: FACTS OF THE CASE
On March 9, 1996, Officer Ronald Cook of the Newton, Iowa, Police Department stopped the vehicle
of Petitioner in this case, Patrick Knowles, for speeding. The officer checked the Petitioner's driver
license and determined that there were no outstanding arrest warrants. The officer issued Knowles a
speeding citation and then conducted a search of both Knowles and the passenger compartment of his
vehicle. During that search, the officer found a pipe and some marijuana under the driver's seat.
Knowles was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana and keeping marijuana in his vehicle.
The officer issued a traffic citation and conducted this search as incident to that citation, pursuant to
Iowa Code 805.1. That special provision allows law enforcement officers to issue a citation in lieu of
making an arrest, as long as the officer initially has the grounds for an arrest. Under the statute, the
issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest or continued custody does not affect the officer's authority to
conduct an otherwise lawful search.
Knowles moved to suppress the admissibility of the seized evidence, claiming that the search violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. The following facts were undisputed (1) The officer stopped Knowles
for speeding, an offense for which he could be arrested, (2) Officer Cook had probable cause for the
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stop, based on the excessive speed, but had no probable cause or suspicion to believe that Knowles was
involved in any other criminal activity; and (3) Knowles did not consent to the search of his vehicle.
The trial court rejected Knowles' motion to suppress the incriminating evidence, and he was then
convicted. On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court upheld his conviction, stating "an election by the officer
to pursue a lesser intrusion, such as issuing a citation, may be conditioned on certain aspects of detention
and search that are conducive to the officer's safety."
Knowles has appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the ACLU and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Attorneys have jointly submitted an amicus curiae brief on his behalf, arguing against
the constitutionality of this Iowa code provision and searches conducted under it.
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS IN NAPO'S AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
"Traffic stops are inherently dangerous and risky and pose a significant threat to the physical safety of
law enforcement officers. Stopping a motor vehicle constitutes one of the least predictable and
potentially most dangerous duties of a law enforcement officer. Each traffic stop presents a situation
where an officer, usually alone and without any other officer support, must confront unknown
individuals, who may be hiding weapons or concealing evidence. It is not uncommon for routine traffic
stops to escalate into violence, without any prior warning to the officer," said Robert T. Scully, NAPO's
executive director.
In fact, tens of thousands of officers have been assaulted. From 1987 through 1996, there were 4,333
law enforcement officers assaulted through use of weapons during traffic stops and pursuits. And since
the advent of the automobile, hundreds of officers have been feloniously killed by drivers or other
occupants of vehicles involved in traffic stops or pursuits.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of a stop and search of a vehicle and its driver stop
rests on the balance between an individual's right of privacy and the public's significant interest in the
safety of its law enforcement officers. In Maryland v. Wilson (upholding the right of officers to order
passengers out of vehicles), the Supreme Court recognized that officer safety during a vehicle stop is
the crucial "public interest" factor in analyzing the reasonableness of searches and seizures. (In
Maryland, the Court cited statistics showing the danger to officers, which were taken directly from
NAPO's amicus curiae brief filed in that case.) Iowa Code 805.1(4), allowing for searches incident to
a citation, is a reasonable effort by the State of Iowa to reduce this danger to police officers during traffic
stops in a less intrusive manner than a full custodial arrest.
Past Supreme Court cases authorize searches of persons and vehicles incident to an arrest based on
probable cause, even before an actual arrest occurs. The purpose of such searches is to discover
weapons (in order to disarm the driver) and to preserve evidence (to prevent its destruction). The
application of the Iowa statute recognizes that a law enforcement officer is exposed to a potentially
dangerous situation whenever the officer stops and detains a vehicle, based on probable cause that a
traffic violation has occurred. The statute is also based on the realization that this danger exists at the
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onset of the stop and detention, regardless of whether the officer eventually decides to make a formal
arrest or issue a citation in lieu of an arrest.
The brief urges the Supreme Court to recognize that the ultimate charging decision made by the police
officer (an arrest or a citation) should not determine the validity of a search of the driver and the
passenger compartment. Limiting searches during traffic stops to only when there is an eventual arrest
would significantly increase the risk of harm to law enforcement officers in Iowa, whenever they issue
a citation instead. The distinction between a search incident to an arrest and a search incident to a
citation is meaningless in the context of officer exposure to significant danger.
Accordingly, searches incident to a citation instead of an arrest advance a significant public interest in
protecting officer safety and are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, any weapon seized or
evidence of crime uncovered during such searches is properly admissible in a criminal case, as was the
evidence of criminality discovered in defendant's vehicle in this case.
Furthermore, issuing a traffic citation is significantly less intrusive on the public than an arrest. A
requirement that an actual arrest must occur before a search for weapons or concealed evidence can take
place would deter law enforcement officers from proceeding in this less intrusive manner and result in
more arrests for traffic offenses. The Iowa statute follows a more reasonable approach by giving officers
needed flexibility, and thus benefits the citizens of Iowa.
In the briefs conclusion, amicus curiae National Association of Police Organizations, Inc. urged the
Supreme Court to apply the doctrine of searches incident to arrests to issuances of citations in lieu of
arrests during traffic stops, given the substantial public interest in officer safety, and to thereby affirm
the judgment in this case of the Iowa Supreme Court.
The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) is a coalition of police unions and
associations from across the United States that serves in Washington, D.C. to advance the interests of
America's law enforcement officers through legislative and legal advocacy, political action and education.
Founded in 1978, NAPO now represents more than 4,000 police unions and associations, over 220,000
sworn law enforcement officers, 3,000 retired officers and more than 100,000 citizens who share a
common dedication to fair and effective crime control and law enforcement.
U.S. Newswire Copyright 1998
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SEAT-BELT CRACKDOWN: MORE POLICE SEARCHES?
The De Moines Register
June 25, 1998
The June 10 article on the future police crackdown on seat-belt use failed to mention that this
"crackdown" will also involve police searches of people and their cars merely for the heinous act of
failing to wear a seat belt. It is a little known fact that in Iowa every traffic stop can result in a
comprehensive search of both the vehicle and the driver. No other state allows this.
According to a series of recent Iowa rulings, during a routine traffic stop the police can search the
driver and the entire interior of the vehicle. They can do this without the driver's consent and need not
suspect the driver of doing anything threatening or illegal. As the Iowa Supreme Court sees it, the simple
allegation that the driver did not buckle up is reason enough to allow his or her body to be searched and
the car ransacked.
This comes as no surprise to the thousands of Iowans, particularly those who are poor or of color,
who have suffered this degrading police tactic.
Many will find news of such "police state" methods unsettling. They are not alone. The Iowa Civil
Liberties Union condemned the practice as an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment in an
amicus curiae (friend-of-the-court) brief filed in an Iowa case (State vs. Knowles) that the U.S. Supreme
Court has agreed to hear. If the high court fails to strike down this outrageous affront to liberty, then
people in the rest of the nation will suffer the personal degradations Iowans are now enduring, and it
might as well be declared that the Constitution does not apply to persons when they are in automobiles.
-R. Ben Stone, executive director, Iowa Civil Liberties Union,
446 Insurance Exchange Bldg., Des Moines.
The Des Moines Register Copyright 1998
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BEYOND PRIVACY, BEYOND PROBABLE CAUSE, BEYOND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: NEW
STRATEGIES FOR FIGHTING PRETEXT ARRESTS
University of Colorado Law Review
Summer 1998
Timothy P. O'Neill
Introduction
Consider the number of minor traffic violations that the typical driver makes each time he or she gets
into a car. After following and observing a motorist for a short distance, a police officer is likely to
witness at least a trivial violation by nearly every driver on the road. Failure to signal for the appropriate
length of time before turning; failure to signal before every lane change, failure to come to a complete
stop at a stop sign; driving too fast, too slowly, or driving too fast for the conditions in the opinion of
the officer--all could justify pulling a car over and issuing a citation. Perhaps this is fair; society certainly
has an interest is ensuring safety on our roads. But what if such violations would justify not only a minor
fine but also the removal of the driver from his or her vehicle and a search of the entire passenger
compartment including all of the driver's belongings? What if the police officer was allowed the
discretion to engage in such a search based on factors such as the neighborhood in which the driver was
traveling, or the driver's clothes, or the color of the driver's skin? Such a practice would be an affront
to our sense ofjustice. One might hope that these types of searches could never be tolerated under our
Bill of Rights. But these practices appear to be precisely in line with the present United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the subject.
On June 10, 1996, the Supreme Court decided Whren v. United States, which dealt with the issue of
"pretext arrests." Whren and Brown were convicted of possession of illegal drugs recovered during a
police stop of their automobile. They asserted that the ostensible reasons their car was stopped by the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department- failure to signal for a turn, not giving full attention
to the operation of a vehicle; unreasonable speed-- were merely "pretextual. " That is, the police had no
actual interest in enforcing these minor traffic code violations, but were merely stopping the car because
Whren and Brown were young African-American men driving in a "high drug area" of Washington, D.C.
This "pretext" enabled the police to engage in a legal "fishing expedition" in which illegal drugs were
found. The traffic offense "pretext" thus allowed the police to search for drugs without having probable
cause to believe any drugs were present.
During the past decade, the issue of "pretext arrests" has produced a wave of academic writing as well
as disagreement among state and federal courts. Yet the Whren decision displayed complete consensus
among the Justices of the Supreme Court. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the stop
was proper simply because there was probable cause to believe the defendants committed the civil traffic
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offenses. The Court went on to hold that any subjective reasons the police had for making the stop--that
is, any "pretexts" they may have had--were irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.
The result of Whren certainly was no surprise. After all, in cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, the government usually has prevailed on key Fourth Amendment issues. What was surprising,
however, was the unanimity in the decision. Not only was there no dissent, there was not even a
concurring opinion. Moreover, the unanimous opinion in Whren was written by Justice Scalia, whose
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has occasionally placed him at odds with the rest of the Court. How
could an issue which had created such controversy throughout academia and the lower courts be
resolved through a unanimous opinion?
Perhaps Whren is a watershed Fourth Amendment case. The unanimous rejection of the defense
position in Whren indicates the need to develop a new paradigm for analyzing issues involving law
enforcement behavior in the area of searches and seizures. As this Article will illustrate, the defense bar,
through its emphasis on "privacy" and on defining a "reasonable" search almost exclusively in terms of
"warrants" and "probable cause," has deprived itself of the vocabulary for expressing what is
constitutionally wrong with a pretextual arrest. The defense bar's crabbed view of the Fourth
Amendment--which has been the focus of important new scholarship by commentators such as William
Stuntz, Scott Sundby, and Akhil Amar--has placed many issues of police behavior outside the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.
This article argues that the defense bar needs to be more receptive to recent scholarship which
challenges traditional defense views of the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As Whren illustrates,
defense attorneys need to think beyond "privacy," "warrants," and "probable cause" in arguing which
searches and seizures are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, defense lawyers need to
go beyond the Fourth Amendment itself It is time to rethink the traditional defense paradigm in search
and seizure situations.
III. That was Whren, This Is Now: Two Approaches For Continuing the Fight
Against Pretext Arrests.
A. Violation of a Law Does Not Necessarily Justify Police Seizure
The petitioners in Whren argued that the issue was whether a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances would have made a stop for the reasons given. Yet the petitioners never made the
argument that there might be some laws which, although concededly valid, may nevertheless fail to
justify a seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. The offenses in Whren were three civil
ordinances, each of which was punishable by a fine of $25. Can something be a valid, legal offense and
yet not important enough to justify a seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment?
The genesis of such an argument can be found in Justice Stewart's provocative concurrence in
Gustafson v. Florida. Justice Stewart noted that Gustafson confined his argument to the proposition that
the search was improper following a custodial arrest performed pursuant to police discretion. However,
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nowhere did Gustafson challenge the constitutionality per se of a custodial arrest for a minor traffic
offense. Thus, although that issue was not before the Court, Stewart wrote "that a persuasive claim
might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Can the police have "probable cause" to take certain action and yet this action would nevertheless be
considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment? This was suggested by Judge Frank
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit in Gramenos v. Jewel Co. Judge Easterbrook noted that under
common law, an arrest for a misdemeanor could be made only if the misdemeanor was committed in the
presence of the arresting officer. He noted that the Supreme Court had "bypassed opportunities" to
decide if this aspect of the common law was part of the Fourth Amendment. Although the issue did not
have to be resolved in Gramenos, Judge Easterbrook noted that "[i]t is important to understand that
'probable cause' is not always the same thing as 'reasonable' conduct by the police."
The concept of an offense which would not justify an arrest by the police may appear paradoxical. But
there currently is a striking example of this found in the law of many states. Forty-nine states have laws
requiring the use of seat belts in automobiles; yet thirty-six of these states forbid the police from stopping
an automobile for commission of this offense. In other words, if the seat belt offense is discovered by
the police pursuant to an otherwise proper stop, the defendant may be charged, but observation of the
offense alone will not justify a stop. Thus, applying the language of Judge Easterbrook's observation,
merely having "probable cause" for an action might not--at least under these state laws--make an action
"reasonable."
Whren does not foreclose an argument that it may be constitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment--or at least under an individual state's version of the Fourth Amendment--to initially make
a stop based on trivial traffic offenses. Analogizing to the seat belt rules in many states, an argument
could be made that while there is nothing constitutionally improper with punishing people for a variety
of trivial mistakes, it is a separate constitutional issue whether it is reasonable to seize and detain a
person solely on the basis of such behavior.
B. Limiting Pretexts by Applying the "Void-for-Vagueness" Doctrine
As discussed above, one criticism of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that it has superseded
the use of other constitutional provisions which may also impact on search and seizure issues. One
example is the Due Process Clause. In the wake of Whren, one theory which merits careful
consideration is the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine derived from the Due Process Clause. It may provide
an effective vehicle for challenging pretext arrests on both the state and federal level.
The basic concept behind the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is that "[n]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Or, in the words of another Supreme Court
decision, "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law."
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Although the traditional black-letter interpretation of "void-for- vagueness" stressed lack of notice to
the public as the basic due process value being vindicated, the Supreme Court has held that this is no
longer true. In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court noted:
Although the [void-for-vagueness] doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary
enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is
not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine--the requirement that a legislature
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." When such guidelines are not provided, the
result is a statute which provides a "standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries
to pursue their personal predilections." Such a statute furnishes "a convenient tool for 'harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure."' The doctrine seeks to prevent law enforcement officers from exercising a "virtually
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation."
How does this apply to Whren? Certainly the offense of failure to signal for a turn is precise enough
to cabin the discretion of police officers. Also the offense of driving at an unreasonable speed is one a
society might want the police to exercise according to their discretion. But consider the offense of not
giving "full attention to the operation of a vehicle." This type of an offense is ripe for a
"void-for-vagueness" attack.
The advantages of the void-for-vagueness doctrine over the Fourth Amendment should be obvious.
One of the reasons for the stop was the existence of the $25 civil violation for failing to "give full time
and attention" to the operation of the vehicle. Consequently, the Whren Court refused to look at the
racial realities of the case, saying only that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."
Yet the void-for-vagueness doctrine meets the realities of discrimination head-on. The quotations from
the Kolender case discussed above show the doctrine's focus on fighting arbitrary, discriminatory
enforcement of laws. The California statute in Kolender punished any person wandering about the streets
who refused to identify himself to a peace officer; the California Supreme Court interpreted the statute
to mean that an individual must provide "credible and reliable" identification. The Court was well aware
that the defendant in Kolender was an African-American man. The Court's opinion prominently notes
that Mr. Lawson--who otherwise had no trouble with law enforcement authorities--had been stopped
for this offense fifteen times during a two-year period. It was clear that Mr. Lawson's race, habits, and
appearance made him a frequent target of police attention. In striking the statute down on
void-for-vagueness grounds, the Court focused on the apparent fact that this statute allowed for
arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement. It placed enormous discretion in the hands of the individual police
officer to determine who came under the ambit of the statute. Kolender-- unlike Whren--looked at the
realities of law enforcement.
Copyright C 1998 University of Colorado Law Review, Inc.; Timothy P. ONeill (footnotes omitted)
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97-7597 KNOWLES v. IOWA
Ruling below (Iowa SupCt, 569 N.W.2d 601):
As held in State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d 620, 61 CrL 1295 (Iowa SupCt 1997), Iowa statute that
confers authority on police to search vehicle involved in traffic violation that would constitute grounds
for arrest does not violate Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
even when no custodial arrest is made.
Question presented: Can state, consistently with Fourth Amendment, enact statute conferring on police
blanket authorization to conduct full-blown search of motor vehicle upon issuance of traffic or
equipment citation?
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STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
V.
Patrick KNOWLES, Appellant.
No. 96-1584.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Oct. 22, 1997.
Considered en banc.
CARTER, Judge.
Defendant, Patrick Knowles, was convicted of
possession of a Schedule I controlled substance
(marijuana) in violation of Iowa Code section
124.401(3) (1995) and keeping a controlled
substance in an automobile in violation of Iowa
Code section 124.402(1)(e). He appeals and
challenges evidentiary rulings that allowed
evidence of marijuana that had been obtained by
a search of his person and automobile incident
to the issuance of a traffic citation. Defendant
divides his grounds for reversal into four
contentions: (1) the lack of probable cause to
search under the Fourth Amendment to the
federal constitution, (2) the invalidity of a
purported statutory grant of authority to search
based on the issuance of a traffic citation, (3)
the invalidity of a purported authorization for
custodial arrest for a speeding violation under
the seizure restrictions of the Fourth
Amendment to the federal constitution, and (4)
that it was unreasonable to detain the defendant
after the issuance of the citation had been
completed. Because we find the controlling
issues of law have been determined adversely to
defendant in State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d 620
(Iowa 1997), we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
We need not consider defendant's first
contention as existing separate and distinct from
the second. The State does not contend that
there was probable cause to search under the
warrant standards of the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant was stopped by police for driving at
an excessive speed. There were no
circumstances indicating that evidence of crime
existed on his person or in his automobile. The
officer's election to search his person and his car
was based solely on the perceived authority to
search conferred by Iowa Code section
805.1(4). We thus proceed to the consideration
of defendant's contention that this statute is
unconstitutional.
We have consistently interpreted section
805.1(4) as providing authority to search when
a traffic violation has occurred that would
constitute grounds for an arrest. State v.
Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Iowa 1996);
State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Iowa
1990). Defendant does not contest the fact that
he was speeding or that there was a statutory
basis for arrest. See Iowa Code section 805.7.
In Doran we upheld the authority to search
conferred by section 805.1(4) in the face of
challenges based on the Fourth Amendment and
article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
Defendant urges us to reconsider our Doran
holding. He asserts that, because the "search
incident to an arrest" exception to the Fourth
Amendment is the only constitutional predicate
on which the State seeks to support the
authority to search his person and automobile,
there must have in fact been a custodial arrest to
satisfy the limitations on searches imposed by
the Fourth Amendment.
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He urges that our holding in Doran that the
constitutional basis for the "search incident to an
arrest" exception is satisfied by the presence of
grounds for arrest rather than the making of a
custodial arrest is misguided. We disagree. The
suggestion that the constitutional basis for the
"search incident to an arrest" exception is an
actual arrest is belied by those decisions that
hold that the timing of the arrest need not
precede the search. See State v. Peterson, 515
N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1994); State v. Beatty,
305 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Iowa 1981). And, when
the search produces an independent ground for
an arrest on a more serious charge, the
foregoing of an arrest for the traffic violation
does not defeat the authority to search. See
People v. Rossi, 102 Ill.App.3d 1069, 1073, 430
N.E.2d 233, 236 (1981).
We are satisfied that our decision in Doran
properly identified the public policy reasons that
support the "search incident to an arrest"
exception when grounds for a legal arrest are
present. When an officer has a legal basis to
make a custodial arrest and thereby acquires
grounds for searching a suspect's person or
automobile in the absence of probable cause, an
election by the
officer to pursue a lesser intrusion, such as
issuing a citation, may be conditioned on certain
aspects of detention and search that are
conducive to the officer's safety. Based on
those considerations, the legislature's grant of
the authority to search provided in section
805.1(4) does not offend against the Fourth
Amendment.
Defendant's third point, which suggests that the
statutory authorization for a custodial arrest on
a speeding charge is an unlawful authorization
of an illegal seizure of the person under the
Fourth Amendment, was not raised in the
motion to suppress before the district court and
thus may not be considered by us. His argument
that he was unreasonably detained following the
issuance of the citation must be rejected because
the further detention was for purposes of
making a search that has now been determined
to be lawful. We have considered all issues
presented and conclude that the judgment of the
district court should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except NEUMAN,
LAVORATO, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ., who
dissent.
NEUMAN, Justice (dissenting).
For the reasons expressed in my dissent to
State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Iowa
1997) (Neuman, J., dissenting), I cannot join the
majority opinion. The constitutional
reasonableness of a statute that purports to
authorize a search that is neither pursuant to
warrant, incident to custodial arrest, or based on
probable cause simply cannot be decided in the
abstract. The validity of such a search is
"pre-eminently the sort of question which can
only be decided in the concrete factual context
of the individual case." Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 59, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901. The
United States Supreme Court has never
departed from this principle and neither, I
respectfully suggest, should we.
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MINNESOTA v. CARTER
By Darren Welch
When the blinds are drawn, does one have a legitimate expectation of privacy? Does it matter who
is inside and what they are doing, even if one is conducting an illegal activity? The Supreme Court must
now decide these fundamental questions on privacy within a residence.
On May 15, 1994, an anonymous informer tipped off an Eagan, Minnesota police officer that as he
walked by an apartment, he observed people bagging a white powder in the apartment. Checking out
the tip, the officer approached the ground floor window of the apartment, left the common sidewalk that
led to the apartment's entrance, and stepped onto a common grassy area closer to the window. The
officer then walked behind some short bushes and stood 12-18 inches from the window, from where he
observed, though gaps in the closed blinds, defendants Wayne Carter and Melvin Jones bagging a white
substance.
Defendant Carter was tried on stipulated facts in Minnesota District Court and was convicted of
conspiracy to commit a controlled-substance crime and aiding and abetting the same. Carter appealed
his conviction, challenging the legality of the police officer's observation through the apartment window.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Carter did not have standing to object to the visual search
because he was not a resident or a social guest, only an acquaintance for business purposes.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed. Justice Tomljanovich, writing for the majority, ruled that
Carter had a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus had standing to challenge the search. The court
reversed the conviction, ruling that the observation through the window was an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide: 1) If an invitee whose sole purpose is to assist in
illegal activity has a legitimate expectation of privacy, and 2) Whether the non-enhanced use of an
officer's senses to observe criminal activity in a residence from a public area outside the curtilage of the
residence is an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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CONNECTICUT SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW: THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT
SHOULD ADOPT A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO
ARTICLE FIRST, SECTION 7, OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION
Bridgeport Law Review
Winter, 1993
Bruce R. Lockwood
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Search & Seizure Law
A search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when the police intrude upon an area where
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. There is a two-fold requirement for Fourth
Amendment protection. First, the person must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy .... " Second, that the "expectation [of privacy] be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable'." A police search of a suspect's home, for example, will invoke the suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights. The fact that the suspect intends to keep his home private by locking his doors and
closing his window blinds indicates an actual subjective expectation of privacy. Furthermore, society
has always recognized the sanctity of the home. Thus, Justice Harlan's two-part test to determine
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists is satisfied. Therefore, the police would need to
obtain a search and seizure warrant to enter the home legally.
Courts favor search warrants over warrantless searches because the warrant process interposes a
neutral judicial official into the probable cause determination. In the warrantless context, the police
officer determines whether probable cause exists and acts without a judicial imprimatur. Judges or
magistrates may issue a search and seizure warrant based upon an affidavit or sworn oral testimony. The
affidavit needs to establish probable cause to search a particular location. In particular, this requires a
showing that the specific items sought are connected with criminal activity and that the items will be
found in the particular location.
Moreover, a police officer attempting to secure a valid search warrant based on information obtained
from an informant should establish the informant's veracity and his basis of knowledge. Indeed, prior
to the Court's 1983 decision in Illinois v. Gates, the United States Supreme Court required police officers
to satisfy this two-part test known as the Aguilar-Spinelli test. However, Gates held that the measure
of probable cause in a search warrant should be based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than
the rigid two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test. Thus, the probable cause standard is an amorphous one.
Nevertheless, a magistrate must be convinced that the police officer's aflidavit establishes probable cause
before he signs and issues the search warrant. But what remedy is available if the police search the
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suspect's home without a warrant or probable cause and seize incriminating evidence? The most
commonly invoked remedy is the exclusionary rule.
1. Exclusionary Rule--Federal Level
The exclusionary rule prohibits prosecutors from using evidence in their case-in-chief that the police
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the incriminating evidence seized by the police
in the suspect's home would be inadmissible in a prosecution against him. The effect of the exclusionary
rule is apparent--guilty criminals may escape prosecution. However, the rationale behind the
exclusionary rule is that it deters the police from violating the Fourth Amendment.
Debate concerning the validity of the exclusionary rule has prevailed for most of the twentieth century.
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the Federal Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States in 1914. Furthermore, in 1949, the United States Supreme Court, in Wolf v.
Colorado incorporated the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied it to the
states. However, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require states to exclude
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search. The lack of vertical uniformity between the federal
courts and those state courts that did not apply the exclusionary rule produced the anomalous "silver
platter" doctrine. Evidence illegally seized by state police officers independent of federal agents was
admissible in federal courts. It was not until 1960 that the Supreme Court overruled this doctrine.
However, state courts still admitted evidence illegally seized by federal agents. Thus, the need for
vertical uniformity was one rationale cited by the Supreme Court in its 1961 landmark decision in Mapp
v. Ohio.
In Mapp, the Supreme Court overruled Wolf, holding that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment was inadmissible not only in federal courts, but also in state courts. Justice Clarke writing
for the 6-3 majority further held that the Fourth Amendment incorporated the exclusionary rule. The
Court based its reasoning primarily on deterrence, in addition to judicial integrity, practical
considerations and due process concerns. Thus, the exclusionary rule was and still is the law of the land,
but in a much diluted sense. For example, in 1976, Justice White's dissent in Stone v. Powell stated that
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule "should be substantially modified so as to prevent its
application in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in
the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law " Justice White's dissent in Stone,
a mere acorn in 1976, took root and matured into a formidable oak tree in the form of the United States
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Leon.
Copyright (C) 1993 by the Bridgeport Law Review Association: Bruce R. Lockwood (footnotes
omitted)
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GLIMPSE OF DRUGS HELD TO JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS SEARCH
New York Law Journal
May 14, 1997
Deborah Pines
POLICE officers were authorized to search a New Haven, Conn., apartment after an informant's tip
led them to a yard where they saw drug activity through a window's partially open blinds, a federal
appeals panel in Manhattan has ruled.
Because the men arrested, James Fields and Christopher Crawley, conducted their activities "in plain
view of an area where others were free to come and go," they failed to demonstrate the 1994 search
violated their privacy rights, declared the panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Fields, 96-1168.
The decision, written by Second Circuit Judge Richard J. Cardamone, affinned the cocaine- trafficking
convictions of Messrs. Fields, 27, and Crawley, 24, both of New Haven. It also construed recent
precedents on such issues as who has standing to challenge police searches and what circumstances
permit police to enter homes without warrants and without knocking and announcing their presence.
Filed on Monday, the ruling was joined in by Second Circuit Judge James L Oakes. A third panel
member, Second Circuit Judge J. Daniel Mahoney, died in October 1996, so the case was decided by
just two members.
Messrs. Fields and Crawley were arrested at around 9 p.m. on Dec. 15, 1994, after an informant told
police the men were bagging crack cocaine in a woman's ground-floor apartment at 381 Edgewood Ave.
in New Haven.
Following the tip, the police entered a fenced-in side yard for the building which has three apartments.
From the yard, they said, they saw the drug activity in a well-lit bedroom through a window with
venetian blinds raised five or six inches.
Police then raided the apartment, using a battering ram to break down a door, without a warrant and
without knocking and announcing their presence. Justifying their haste, they said, were many factors
including the fact that the informant said the men would be leaving soon. They also cited fear of
potential violence and destruction of the evidence - $40,000 worth of crack cocaine.
After a trial, Mr. Fields was convicted on two drug counts and sentenced by Connecticut Chief District
Judge Peter C. Dorsey to 20 years in prison and a $25,000 fine. Mr. Crawley, who entered a conditional
guilty plea to one count, reserving his right to challenge his arrest, was sentenced by Judge Dorsey to
six years in prison.
Privacy Rights
On appeal, both men argued the evidence seized should have been suppressed for many reasons. They
claimed the search, based on peering through the window of a private residence, violated their Fourth
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Amendment privacy rights. They also argued the case circumstances did not justify the officers'
warrantless entry and failure to knock and announce themselves.
Judge Cardamone disagreed.
After finding the men, who had permission from the rental tenant to use the apartment more than 40
time prior to their arrest, have standing to challenge the search, Judge Cardamone found the search did
not violate their privacy rights.
He distinguished this case from a 1996 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
United States v. Blount, 98 F.3d 1489, which invalidated a police search following an officer's peering
from a private yard through a boarded up window after leaning against the building.
Judge Cardamone noted Blount involved police entering a private yard of a single-family residence
unlike this case which involved police entering a yard shared by residents of a multi-family building. He
also noted police in Blount peered through a narrow gap in plywood, where here police looked through
a five-to-six-inch opening beneath the window blinds.
"By exposing their illicit cocaine activities to the side yard, a place where they should have anticipated
that other persons might have a right to be, defendants failed to exhibit a subjective expectation that they
intended their dealings in the bedroom to be private," Judge Cardamone wrote.
Copyright 1997 by the New York Law Publishing Company
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97-1147 Minnesota v. Carter
Ruling below as to respondent Carter (State v. Carter, Minn SupCt, 569 N.W.2d 169, 66 LW 1207,
61 CrL 1548):
Defendant who was in apartment with permission of leaseholder and, while there, collaborated with
leaseholder on shared, albeit illegal, task while there for some two and one-half hours had standing to
challenge legality of search of apartment; officer's act of peeking through cracks in closed window blind,
from vantage point accessed only through extraordinary measures of leaving sidewalk, traversing grassy
area, and climbing over bushes, to spot where neither neighbors nor general public would be expected
to be, qualified as search and violated state and federal constitutions.
Ruling below as to respondent Johns (State v. Johns, Minn SupCt, 569 N.W.2d 180):
Lower court opinion upholding defendant's convictions is reversed on basis of reasoning in State v.
Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 66 LW 1207, 61 CrL 1548 (Minn SupCt 1997).
Questions presented: (1) Does invitee into residence, whose sole purpose for being present is to assist
resident in illegal activity, have legitimate expectation of privacy under Fourth Amendment while within
residence? (2) Under Fourth Amendment, does police officer's non-enhanced use of his natural senses
to observe criminal activity in residence from public area outside curtilage of residence constitute search?
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Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Sept. 11, 1997.
TOMLJANOVICH, Justice.
By looking through the gaps in the closed
blinds covering a window, a police officer
observed the appellant, Wayne Thomas Carter,
as he engaged in a drug- packaging operation
with two other persons, one of whom was the
leaseholder of the apartment. The district court
held that Carter, who was an out-of-state
visitor, did not present any evidence to establish
his standing to contest the legality of the
observation. The court also concluded that the
officer did not conduct a search because he
made the observations from an area where
Carter did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court, but based its holding only on the
finding that Carter did not have standing to
bring a motion to suppress any evidence
obtained from the officer's observations. We
reverse, and hold that the evidence was
sufficient to establish that Carter had standing to
challenge the legality of the observation. We
further hold that the officer's observation rose to
the level of a search, and that the officer's lack
of probable cause and a warrant rendered the
search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota
Constitution.
At approximately 8 p.m. on the evening of May
15, 1994, an anonymous informant approached
Eagan police officer Jim Thielen. The
informant, whom Thielen never had seen before,
told Thielen that he/she had walked by
apartment 103 at 3943 South Valley View Drive
and observed people sitting around a table inside
the apartment "bagging" a white powder. The
informant also told Thielen that he/she believed
the occupants of the apartment had used a blue
four-door Cadillac located in the parking lot
adjacent to the apartment complex. The
informant also told Thielen that the car had an
Illinois license plate that read SGD 896. In
response to this infonnation, Thielen went to the
complex and approached the ground floor
window of apartment 103. Thielen then walked
toward the window of the apartment by leaving
the common sidewalk that led to the apartment
building's entrance and stepping on a grassy
common area closer to the window. Thielen
then walked behind some short bushes located
in front of the apartment window and stood
approximately 12 to 18 inches from the window.
The window's blinds were drawn closed, but
gaps in the blinds allowed Thielen to observe
activity in the apartment. While looking
through the gaps in the blinds, Thielen observed
two males and one female sitting at a kitchen
table. One of the males appeared to be placing
a white powdery substance onto the kitchen
table. This person then would pass the white
substance to the second male who then would
place the powder into a plastic bag. The second
male, who was wearing bedroom slippers,
would in turn give the plastic bag to the female
who would cut off the ends of the bag and place
it on the table.
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After observing this activity for approximately
15 minutes, Thielen left the apartment complex
and went to a nearby fire station where he had
another conversation with the informant and
another Eagan police officer. At this time the
informant told the officers that the people inside
the apartment might be in possession of a gun.
Thielen then returned to the apartment complex
where he located a Cadillac matching the
description given by the informant. He then
returned to the fire station, telephoned Officer
Kevin Kallestad of the South Metro Drug Task
Force, and reported what he had seen.
Kallestad instructed Thielen to stop and secure
the suspect vehicle should anyone attempt to
drive it away. Police also began to prepare
affidavits as part of a request for warrants to
search both the apartment and the Cadillac.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., an Eagan police
officer observed two males putting items into
the suspect Cadillac. The two males then
entered the vehicle and started to drive it out of
the parking lot. As per instructions, Eagan
police stopped the vehicle at the intersection of
Rahn Road and Beau de Rue Drive. The police
found Carter in the driver's seat and Melvin
Johns in the passenger's seat. The police
ordered both men out of the car. As the police
opened the door to let Johns out of the car, they
observed a black zippered pouch and a handgun,
later determined to be loaded, on the floor of
the vehicle. The police then placed Carter and
Johns under arrest. The police subsequently
towed the Cadillac to the Eagan Police
Department, and after receiving the signed
search warrant at approximately 1:30 a.m. on
May 16, the police searched the vehicle. When
the officers opened the black zippered pouch,
they discovered a white mixture in plastic
baggies, Johns' identification, pagers, and a
scale. Tests later determined that the white
mixture was 47.1 grams of cocaine.
Late in the evening of May 15, after the arrests
of Carter and Johns, Eagan police returned to
apartment 103 and arrested its occupant,
Kimberly Thompson. At approximately 3 a.m.
on May 16, police executed a search warrant on
the apartment and located cocaine residue on
the kitchen table and plastic baggies consistent
with those found in the automobile driven by
Carter. Thielen subsequently identified Carter,
Johns and Thompson as the individuals he had
observed in the apartment packaging the white
mixture. He identified Carter as the individual
he had seen putting the white mixture on the
table and dividing it into piles, Johns as the man
who wore slippers and placed the piles into
baggies, and Thompson as the individual who
cut the ends off the baggies and placed the
baggies in piles. Police ultimately learned that
Carter and Johns were residents of Chicago,
Illinois, and that Thompson was the sole lessee
of apartment 103. Subsequent to his arrest,
Carter made a statement to the police in which
he admitted ownership of a duffel bag found
inside the Cadillac. A search of the duffel bag
uncovered a digital gram scale containing traces
and residue of cocaine. Johns made a statement
to the police admitting he had accepted a
proposal to transport cocaine from Illinois to
Minnesota for money, and that he, Carter and
Thompson had packaged the cocaine at
Thompson's apartment. He also admitted that
there were approximately two ounces of crack
cocaine and a handgun in the vehicle.
Carter, Johns and Thompson made motions
through joint counsel to suppress their
statements and all evidence seized from both the
apartment and the Cadillac. They argued,
among other things, that Thielen's initial
observation through the window of Thompson's
apartment was an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment and that all evidence
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obtained as a result of those observations should
be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. After
a two-day omnibus hearing, the district court
denied the motions to suppress of Carter and
Johns. The court held that the two defendants
did not have standing to challenge Thielen's
observations through Thompson's window
because both defendants failed to present
evidence that their expectations of privacy in the
apartment were based upon "understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society."
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.
12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 n. 12 (1978). In
particular, the court noted that the only evidence
presented by the defense showed that the two
defendants were out- of-state residents who had
been at the apartment for a period of time on
May 15, 1994. The district court also
concluded that Thielen's observation was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because the officer made his
observation from an area in which the
defendants had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Following the district court's denial of their
motions to suppress, Carter and Johns
proceeded with separate counsel. The district
court tried Carter on stipulated facts and found
Because the facts of this case are not in dispute,
we will review de novo the district court's denial
of Carter's motion to suppress. State v.
Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn.1992).
Before a criminal defendant can bring a motion
to suppress evidence on the basis that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the defendant must show that he or she is a
proper party to assert the claim of illegality and
to seek the remedy of exclusion. To establish
such a showing, a party must demonstrate two
things: First, that he or she has an adversary
interest in the outcome. Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 702, 7 L.Ed.2d
him guilty of conspiracy to commit a controlled-
substance crime in the first degree and aiding
and abetting a controlled- substance crime in the
first degree. Minn.Stat. s 152.021, subd. 1(1),
subd. 3(a) (1996), Minn.Stat. s 609.05 (1996).
The district court denied Carter's request for a
downward departure and sentenced him to 86
months. Carter appealed his conviction,
challenging the legality of Thielen's observations
through Thompson's apartment window. The
court of appeals held that Carter did not have
standing to object to Thielen's actions because
Carter's claim that he was predominantly a
social guest was "inconsistent with the only
evidence concerning his stay in the apartment,
which indicates that he used it for a business
purpose--to package drugs." State v. Carter,
545 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn.App.1996).
We therefore begin our analysis by addressing
the question of standing, and only if we
determine that Carter had standing to bring a
motion to suppress evidence recovered as a
result of Thielen's observation of the apartment,
will we address the legality of Thielen's actions--
whether his observation qualified as a search,
and if it did, whether it was reasonable.
1. Standing
663 (1962). And second, that the adverse
interest is based upon an alleged violation of the
rights of the individual, rather than the violation
of the rights of some third party. Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725,
731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (19 60)(overruled on other
grounds). As far as the first factor is concerned,
a criminal defendant against whom the allegedly
illegally obtained evidence is being offered
surely qualifies as one who has an adversary
interest. See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure s 11.3, at 117 (3d ed.1996) (hereinafter
LaFave). Consequently we hold that Carter had
an adversarial interest in the outcome. The
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analysis of the second factor is not so easily
decided, however. As the United States
Supreme Court has told us, the question turns
on a "determination of whether the disputed
search has infringed an interest of the defendant
which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. at
429. Such an interest exists when "the person
who claims the protection of the Amendment
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place." Id. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430. The
question before us, therefore, is whether Carter
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
Thompson's apartment.
A defendant has a legitimate expectation of
privacy when his or her subjective expectation
of privacy is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' " Id. at 143-44 n. 12,
99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12 (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516,
19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring)).
In other words, a criminal defendant must make
two showings to establish that he or she based
the motion to suppress upon an alleged violation
of his or her individual Fourth Amendment
right. First, he or she must show a subjective
expectation of privacy, and second, he or she
must show that this expectation was reasonable
in light of "longstanding social customs that
serve functions recognized as valuable by
society." Olson, 495 U.S. at 98, 110 S.Ct. at
1689.
In the case at bar, it is clear that Carter had a
subjective expectation of privacy. He was inside
the apartment of an acquaintance with the doors
shut and the blinds drawn. The more difficult
question is whether Carter's expectation was
legitimate, that is, whether the expectation was
the type that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Both the district court and court of
appeals concluded that Carter failed to establish
that his subjective expectation was legitimate.
The district court based its conclusion on the
fact that Carter offered no evidence that his
status in relation to the apartment was similar to
the status of the defendant in Olson, or that his
status was such that it provided a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the apartment.
Likewise, the court of appeals based its
conclusion on the fact that Carter's claim that he
was a social guest was inconsistent with the
"only evidence concerning his stay in the
apartment, which indicates that he used it for a
business purpose " Carter, 545 N.W.2d at 698.
In both cases, the courts focused on the facts of
Olson, a case in which there was no dispute that
the criminal defendant was an overnight guest of
the person who had the possessory interest of
the searched residence.
By comparison, it is undisputed that Carter
failed to produce any evidence that he was a
"guest" of Thompson's, let alone an "overnight
guest." But a closer reading of Olson reveals
that the Supreme Court does not require a
person to establish his or her status as either a
guest or overnight guest before that person can
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in a
location that is searched. Instead, the person
must establish only that under the totality of the
circumstances, the person's subjective
expectation was the type of expectation that
"society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'
Admittedly, such a test is a difficult one to
define, let alone apply. But the Supreme Court's
own words offer guidance. "To hold that an
overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the
everyday expectations that we all share. Staying
overnight in another's home is a longstanding
social custom that serves functions recognized
as valuable by society." Olson, 495 U.S. at 98,
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110 S.Ct. at 1689. In other words, the Court in
Olson did not recognize the expectation of
privacy as legitimate merely because the criminal
defendant was a guest. Rather, it recognized
the defendant's expectation of privacy as
legitimate because the criminal defendant's
status as a guest was the type of longstanding
social custom that serves functions recognized
as valuable by society. As the Court went on to
state: "The point is that hosts will more likely
than not respect the privacy interest of their
guests, who are entitled to a legitimate
expectation of privacy despite the fact that they
have no legal interest in the premises and do not
have the legal authority to determine who may
or may not enter the household." Olson, 495
U.S. at 99, 110 S.Ct. at 1689. Consequently, if
Carter had established that his status is the type
that serves functions recognized as valuable by
society, his expectation of privacy would have
been legitimate.
The stipulated facts show that the apartment's
leaseholder allowed Carter and Johns into her
apartment for the purpose of packaging cocaine
in exchange for one-eighth ounce of cocaine,
that Thielen observed all three persons inside the
apartment as they collaborated to divide and
package the cocaine; that Carter and Johns
remained inside the apartment for at least 2 1/2
hours, and that Johns was wearing bedroom
slippers while inside the apartment. Although
we recognize that these facts probably fail to
establish Carter as a "guest" of the apartment's
leaseholder, we conclude that they were
sufficient to prove that Carter was the type of
person who possessed a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the apartment. After all, Carter
had the leaseholder's permission to be inside the
apartment. He remained inside the apartment
for at least 2 1/2 hours, during which time he
worked in concert with the leaseholder on a
common task. Whether these facts establish
Carter as a visitor, invitee or business partner
does not matter. As the Court has carefully
noted, arcane distinctions developed in property
and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees,
and the like do not control. Jones, 362 U.S. at
266, 80 S.Ct. at 734. What does control,
however, is the nature of the relationship
between the property possessor and the person
alleging the privacy interest in the property. If
the relationship is the type that society
recognizes as valuable, then we will find
standing. If it is not, then we will not. Although
society does not recognize as valuable the task
of bagging cocaine, we conclude that society
does recognize as valuable the right of property
owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the
privacy of their homes to conduct a common
task, be it legal or illegal activity. We,
therefore, hold that Carter had standing to bring
his motion to suppress the evidence gathered as
a result of Thielen's observations.
II. The Search
Having determined that Carter had standing to
assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment, we
now turn to the question of whether Thielen's
observation constituted a search. A search
occurs whenever government agents intrude
upon an area where a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90
L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at
360, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J. concurring)).
The state argues Thielen's observations did not
rise to the level of a search because he was not
inside the leaseholder's "curtilage" when he
made his observation. As support for its
argument, the state otfers State v. Krech, 403
N.W.2d 634 (Minn.1987) for the proposition
that the common grounds of multi-unit
apartment complexes are not entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. In Krech, we stated: "it
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is a fair generalization that the lands adjoining a
multiple-occupancy residence are less likely to
receive Fourth Amendment protection than the
yard of a single family residence" because "the
privacy expectation as to such an area is often
diminished because it is not subject to the
exclusive control of one tenant and is utilized by
tenants generally and the numerous visitors
attracted to a multiple occupancy building. "403
N.W.2d at 637. The state's argument misses the
point of Krech, however.
In developing the concept of "curtilage," the
Supreme Court actually extended Fourth
Amendment protection to those areas so
intimately tied to the home itself that an
individual reasonably could have expected
persons to treat those areas as part of the home.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107
S.Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987). The curtilage cases,
therefore, necessarily involve factual scenarios
in which police search areas spatially removed
from the home itself See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S.
at 297, 107 S.Ct. at 1137 (agents entered area
surrounding barns, 50 feet from house); Krech,
403 N.W.2d at 637-38 (police entered yard of
duplex where garbage cans were kept). The key
question in a curtilage case is not where the
police officer was standing when he made his
observation, although police officers must
establish that they had a legal right to be where
they were at the time of the observation, rather
it is the area that was observed. Although it is
plausible that Thielen's presence just outside the
apartment window was legitimate, the state
cannot rely on Thielen's position alone to justify
his subsequent observation into the apartment.
The fact that a police officer was situated
outside a residence's curtilage does not
necessarily eliminate the occupant's expectation
of privacy within the interior of the dwelling. 1
LaFave, supra, s 2.3(d), at 495-96.
The fundamental question under Katz is
whether the looking intruded upon the justified
expectation of privacy of the occupant.
This, in turn, ordinarily requires consideration
of two factors: (1) the location of the officer at
the time of the viewing, and (2) the precise
manner in which the view was achieved.Id. at
497.
This, of course, does not mean that all instances
in which a police officer looks into a house or
apartment will be a search under the Fourth
Amendment. "What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at
511. We, therefore, have held that police did
not violate a homeowner's expectation of
privacy by walking onto the homeowner's
driveway and observing stolen property that was
in plain sight from the driveway. State v. Crea,
305 Minn. 342, 346, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739
(1975). Other courts similarly have found no
Fourth Amendment protection for activities that
are easily observable by the general public.
People v. Wright, 41 Ill.2d 170, 242 N.E.2d
180 (1968) (finding no search where officer
standing on transit authority right-of-way was
able to see through a crack in the window
curtain into defendants apartment).
People who close their doors and window
blinds, however, do not knowingly expose their
activities to the public. Consequently, we
conclude that Carter, Johns, and Thompson
took sufficient precautions to keep their
activities private. It was only after Thielen left
the sidewalk, walked across the grass, climbed
over some bushes, crouched down and placed
his face 12 to 18 inches from the window that
their activities became observable. As one
noted commentator has stated:
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[W]hen police surveillance takes place at a
position which cannot be called a "public
vantage point," i.e., when the police--though not
trespassing on the defendant's curtilage--resort
to the extraordinary step of positioning
themselves where neither neighbors nor the
general public would be expected to be, the
observation or overhearing of what is occurring
within a dwelling constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. This is really what Katz is
all about.
1 LaFave, supra, s 2.3(d), at 482. Several
courts have agreed that it is a search whenever
police take extraordinary measures to enable
themselves to view the inside of a private
structure. The question before us, therefore, is
whether Thielen took extraordinary measures to
enable him to view the inside of the apartment.
Although it is a close question whether
Thielen's location at the time of his observation
was legitimate, the totality of his acts makes
such a determination unnecessary. For even if
we concluded that the area just outside the
apartment window was a common area, the fact
that Thielen left the sidewalk, walked across the
grass, climbed over the bushes, placed his face
within 12 to 18 inches of the window and
peered through a small gap between the blinds
makes it clear that he took extraordinary
measures to enable himself to view the inside of
a private dwelling. If we conclude that his
actions constituted anything other than a search,
it is difficult to imagine when we would be able
to say that any activity short of an actual
physical intrusion of a dwelling would violate a
person's expectation of privacy. We therefore
hold that Thielen's conduct constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.
III. Reasonableness of the Search
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from,
among other things, unreasonable searches.
U.S. const., amend. IV In order for a search to
be reasonable, the police must have both
probable cause and a search warrant. Id.; In re
Welfare of G. (NMN) M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 692
(Minn.1997). In the case at bar, the state
conceded that, prior to his observations through
Thompson's window, Thielen did not have
probable cause to obtain a search warrant. The
facts also show that Thielen did not have a
search warrant at the time of the observation.
Despite these facts, the state now asserts that
Thielen's search was reasonable because he had
a reasonable basis for believing the occupants of
Thompson's apartment were engaged in drug
activity and because his search was minimally
intrusive. As the Supreme Court made clear in
Katz, however, conduct that would constitute
an illegal search does not become something less
merely because the police had reasonable
suspicion and embarked on a search of limited
intrusiveness- As such, we once again reject the
notion that a little bit of information justifies a
little bit of a search.
Reversed.
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MITCHELL v. U.S.
By Darren Welch
The Fifth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right not to testify and to not have that refusal
held against her. If that privilege does not exist during the sentencing phase, the defendant is opening
herself up to a stiffer sentence for refusing to testify, thus perhaps contravening the spirit of the Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court will now decide if a defendant has the right to remain silent at the
sentencing phase of the trial.
Defendant Amanda Mitchell, a former factory worker in her mid-forties, was indicted with 22 other
defendants in a cocaine conspiracy. Mitchell entered an open plea of guilty (not induced by a plea
bargain) to all charges but reserved the right to contest the amount of drugs that she distributed. U.S.
District Court judge Edward Cahn recognized the reservation and at the sentencing hearing other
members of the drug conspiracy testified that Mitchell had distributed over five kilograms of cocaine.
Mitchell refused to testify on her own behalf as to the amount of cocaine she distributed. The judge
made a finding that Mitchell had distributed over five kilograms of cocaine and sentenced her to the
mandatory 120-month minimum sentence. The judge said he based his factual finding that Mitchell had
sold over five kilograms of cocaine at least partly on the fact that she did not testify in her own behalf
On appeal, Mitchell argued that the Fifth Amendment should apply to sentencing. Mitchell's attorney
stressed that Mitchell invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege for fear that her own testimony would
make her look more culpable that she really was and would raise her sentence.
The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence. Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Sloviter stated that
the defendant no longer retained the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment at a sentencing hearing.
Although Mitchell did face a potentially stiffer penalty for what her testimony may have produced, it did
not expose her to implication in other crimes. The judge argued that so long as the testimony can not
further incriminate her, the Fifth Amendment's protection does not apply at sentencing. Sloviter also
relied on hornbook law which states that upon conviction, "criminality ceases- and with criminality, the
privilege."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether a criminal defendant has a right to
remain silent at sentencing. The Supreme Court ruled in Evie/le v. Smith (1981) that a convicted
criminal in a capital case retains her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during sentencing,
but apparently the Court has not addressed the issue in non-capital cases.
All other circuits to consider the issue have ruled that the Fifth Amendment does apply if the
testimony could be used to increase the sentence.
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The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urged the Supreme Court to take the appeal
and rule in favor of Mitchell. The association argues that the Third Circuit's ruling confronts defendant's
with a "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, contempt, or perjury.
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TOP COURT TO REVIEW RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT; DRUG SENTENCING
HEARING AT ISSUE
Chicago Tribune
June 16, 1998
Glen Elsasser, Washington Bureau.
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to review the case of a Pennsylvania woman, a recovered drug
addict serving a 10-year prison term for refusing to tell a judge how much cocaine she might have
distributed.
"I am thankful to be alive today, (for) getting away from drugs," Amanda Mitchell told the judge at her
1996 sentencing. Mitchell added that she was so addicted to drugs that she could not have been involved
in a large-scale operation to sell them.
As a result of her refusal to say more, U.S. District Judge Edward Cahn relied on conflicting testimony
about Mitchell's activities from members of an Allentown drug ring and gave her the
mandatory minimum sentence.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia last year upheld the sentence.
At issue in the case is a defendant's right to remain silent at sentencing without being penalized.
Mitchell's lawyer, Steven Morley of Philadelphia, on Monday explained the issue raised by her appeal:
"The significant thing here is that she invoked her 5th Amendment privilege for fear that her own
testimony would make her look more culpable than she was and drive her sentence higher and higher."
He stressed that Mitchell, a former factory worker in her mid-40s, "got involved with people in the
conspiracy primarily as a user" and has no "reliable measure" of the drugs she might have handled in the
few drug transactions she was involved in.
According to Morley, Mitchell had no prior criminal record when she started using cocaine in the early
1990s. At one point, he said, she had to sell her furniture to maintain her habit.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers had urged the court to hear Mitchell's appeal
and to rule that a defendant can remain silent without penalty at sentencing.
"A criminal defendant who has pleaded guilty retains the right to assert the 5th Amendment privilege
against being compelled to be a witness against herself at sentencing," the association
told the court.
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Furthermore, the association said, the increased sentence "was expressly predicated on drawing an
adverse inference" from Mitchell's silence.
The friend of the court brief cited Justice Department statistics showing that 90 percent of federal
criminal defendants whose cases are not dismissed plead guilty as Mitchell did.
"In the vast majority of federal cases, sentencing is the most important issue," the brief said. "Conduct
for which the defendant has not been convicted can add years to her punishment in the most routine
cases."
Copyright 1998 The Chicago Tribune
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--FIFTH AMENDMENT--THIRD CIRCUIT DENIES SELF-
INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE AT SENTENCING HEARING.--UNITED STATES v.
MITCHELL, 122 F.3D 185 (3D CIR. 1997).
Harvard Law Review
February, 1998
In Estelle v. Smith, the Supreme Court ruled that a convicted criminal defendant in a capital case
retained her Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination through sentencing. Several circuit courts
have extended this Fifth Amendment protection to convicted defendants facing noncapital sentencing.
In United States v. Mitchell, the Third Circuit split from the other circuit courts of appeal by holding
that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty waives her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
regarding that offense at her sentencing hearing.
In 1995, the U.S. Attorney's Office charged Amanda Mitchell and twenty-two other defendants with
participation in a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy between 1989 and 1994. Mitchell entered an open plea
of guilty to all charges, but specifically reserved the right to contest the amount of cocaine at issue. The
district judge acknowledged her reservation and agreed that the quantity of cocaine would be determined
at the sentencing hearing. Before accepting Mitchell's guilty plea, the judge instructed her that, by
pleading guilty, she would be waiving her rights, including her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
Testimony at Mitchell's sentencing hearing suggested that Mitchell had distributed over five kilograms
of cocaine, the threshold for a ten- year minimum sentence under federal law. Mitchell's attorney
disputed this evidence, but Mitchell invoked her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and did not
testify on her own behalf Before announcing Mitchell's sentence, the district judge specifically told her
that he held it against her that she declined to testify. The judge then made a finding of fact that Mitchell
had sold almost thirteen kilograms of cocaine, and sentenced her to ten years imprisonment. Mitchell
appealed, claiming that the district court erred in denying her Fifth Amendment privilege at sentencing.
The Third Circuit affirmed. Chief Judge Sloviter held that, once a defendant pleads guilty to an offense,
she cannot invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege regarding that offense at sentencing. The court
asserted that a guilty plea constituted a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to that
offense, when the plea is made knowingly and intelligently.
The court distinguished cases from other circuits that seemed to extend Fifth Amendment protection
through sentencing, and argued that "in most instances the courts have explained that the witness would
have been at risk of prosecution on other offenses." The Third Circuit concluded that "the Fifth
Amendment privilege is not implicated when a defendant is asked to talk about the crime to which he
has pled guilty . . Nor is the privilege implicated if the sentence imposed is more harsh because of the
defendant's response to that interrogation." Arguing that the quantity of cocaine was not "an issue of
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independent criminality," the court asserted that allowing Mitchell's exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege in this context would impermissibly "fragment the sentencing process."
The Third Circuit's decision marked a dramatic departure from the overwhelming weight of case law.
Every other circuit that has ruled on this issue has decided that a defendant retains her Fifth Amendment
privilege if her testimony could be used to increase her sentence. To reach its broad Fifth Amendment
decision, the Third Circuit improvidently stepped over a more narrow issue that should have been
decisive: Mitchell's express reservation of the right to contest the quantity of drugs, which arguably
included an expectation that her Fifth Amendment right would remain effective on that issue. Thus, the
Mitchell court not only refused to recognize a general Fifth Amendment privilege at sentencing, but also
cut more deeply by abrogating a condition on which Mitchell relied when she entered her guilty plea.
Although it rejected a well-settled rule, the Third Circuit provided no authority in support of its holding
except a footnote from one of its own prior opinions. Given the apparent applicability of Estelle v.
Smith, the court should have been loathe to split from the other federal courts absent a compelling
justification. Chief Judge Sloviter offered only one possible justification: "one cannot logically fragment
the sentencing process for this purpose." However, there is no perspicuous basis for the conclusion that
asserting the privilege at sentencing attempts to divide issues that are not conceptually severable.
Obviously, it would have been procedurally feasible to abstain from drawing any negative inference from
Mitchell's refusal to testify. And the Third Circuit suggested no principled reason why the court must
treat each "issue of independent criminality" as an indivisible block. Indeed, in Mitchell's case, the
dispute over quantity at a separate sentencing hearing effectively fractured the distribution charge
regardless of her Fifth Amendment status. The Third Circuit thus gave no principled rationale for why
Mitchell's privilege did not extend to sentencing.
Even if the Third Circuit had articulated a convincing justification for denying the privilege generally
at sentencing, the court disregarded the very real possibility that Mitchell had reasonably relied on a
contrary expectation when she entered her guilty plea. Mitchell and her attorney made a point of
emphasizing the reservation when she entered her plea, and the judge specifically acknowledged that the
plea contained no admission regarding the quantity of drugs. Because she wanted to avoid testifying,
and yet maintain an effective defense, it seems unlikely that Mitchell would have intentionally placed
herself in a position in which her silence would render her defense ineffectual. Mitchell must have
believed that her reservation had a more protective effect.
Amanda Mitchell entered a plea of guilty under the reasonable expectation that she would have the
opportunity at sentencing to contest effectively the quantity of cocaine at issue in her case. Thus,
Mitchell's trial was adversarial only up to a point. As long as the government is not required to meet its
evidentiary burden independently at sentencing hearings, the crucial Fifth Amendment privilege also
exists only up to a point--a point far short of the need to provide what is not only "a shelter to the
guilty," but also "a protection to the innocent."
Copyright (C) 1998 Harvard Law Review Association (footnotes omitted)
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THIRD CIRCUIT REFUSES TO APPLY FIFTH AMENDMENT TO SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS
Champion
January/February, 1998
David S. Rudolf and Thomas K. Maher
The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Mitchell stands in stark contrast to Balsys. While
Balsys involved a rare fact pattern, Mitchell was a set of facts all too common. Mitchell plead guilty to
a charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and the battle at sentencing was over the amount of drugs
for which she was accountable. While the court in Balsys showed an understanding of and appreciation
for the Fifth Amendment, the Mitchell court showed neither. In fact, the court came to the startling
conclusion that the Fifth Amendment has no application at sentencing, at least for a defendant who has
plead guilty.
Mitchell's legal odyssey began with an indictment that named her and many other defendants with
conspiring to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with several substantive counts. Both the
application of a mandatory minimum sentence, and the determination of the sentencing range under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, depended heavily upon the amount of drugs for which a given defendant
was responsible. Mitchell plead guilty to all counts, without any plea agreement. During the plea,
Mitchell's counsel made clear that Mitchell would contest the amount of drugs for which she was
responsible. The court informed Mitchell that she was waiving her trial rights, including her Fifth
Amendment right not to testify against herself Mitchell then stated that she was in fact guilty, and her
plea was accepted.
At sentencing the government presented several witnesses who testified to Mitchell's activities and drug
amounts. At the close of the testimony, the district attorney said that he believed Mitchell no longer
retained the right not to testify because she had plead guilty to the offense and thereby waived her Fifth
Amendment privilege. The court then relied upon Mitchell's failure to testify in finding that the
government had established the amount of drugs for which Mitchell was responsible.
The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that a convicted defendant has no Fifth Amendment right not to
testify at sentencing.
Although the court discussed the issue in terms of waiver, it also explicitly equated Mitchell's position
with that of a defendant convicted by a jury: "[b]y voluntarily and knowingly pleading guilty to the
offense Mitchell waived her Fifth Amendment privilege and stood before the court in the same position
as if she had been convicted by a jury." The court then went on to hold--as a matter of first
impression--that a convicted defendant has no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to give testimony that
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may adversely affect their sentence. Rather, the court held that the Fifth Amendment protects only
against testimony that may lead to conviction for a crime.
We see nothing in the Fifth Amendment ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself...") or in the Supreme Court's cases construing it that provides any basis for
holding that the self-incrimination that it precluded extends to testimony that would have an impact on
the appropriate sentence for the crime of conviction. The sentence is the penalty for the very crime of
conviction, and if one could refuse to testify regarding the sentence then that would contravene the
established principle that upon conviction, "criminality ceases, and with criminality the privilege." 8
Wigmore, Evidence s 2279 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
This conclusion is startling. To say that nothing in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the
protection of the Fifth Amendment extends to sentencing is to ignore the precedent that led the Second
Circuit to apply the privilege to potential foreign prosecutions. If the Fifth Amendment privilege is
intended to protect citizens against the "cruel trilemma" of self- accusation, contempt or perjury and
prevent government overreaching, how can one justify placing defendants in the position of being forced
to provide testimony that may significantly increase a prison sentence.
In fact, under the Third Circuit's reasoning, a defendant could be forced to provide testimony that
would justify a life sentence under the guidelines. Indeed, one could justify forcing a defendant convicted
of murder, and facing a capital sentencing proceeding, to testify on the glib assertion that "criminality"
had ceased upon conviction, and the privilege therefore disappeared. All of the principles identified by
the Second Circuit support extending the Fifth Amendment to sentencing proceedings.
If the Third Circuit really meant what it said, the decision bodes ill for the principles behind the Fifth
Amendment.
Copyright (C) 1998 by the National Association of Criminal De/ense Laiwyers,
Inc.; David S. Rudolf Thomas K Maher
200
97-7541 MITCHELL v. U.S.
Ruling below (CA 3, 61 CrL 1552):
Defendant who pleads guilty to distributing cocaine but reserves right to contest amount of cocaine
for which she should be held responsible does not have Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify during
sentencing in absence of claim that her testimony would expose her to future federal or state prosecution.
Question presented: Does criminal defendant have Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at
sentencing?
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UNITED STATES, Appellees
V.
Amanda MITCHELL, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit
September 9, 1997
Digest of Opinion: Defendant Amanda
Mitchell and 22 other defendants were indicted
for their roles in a cocain conspiracy. Mitchell
entered an open plea of guilty- that is, her plea
was not premised on a plea agreement- to all
four counts with which she was charged, but she
reserved the right to contest the quantity of
cocaine which she distributed. During the plea
colloquy, the court explained that Mitchell
would be waiving her rights by pleading guilty,
including specifically her Fifth Amendment right
not to testify.
At sentencing, the defendant's co-defendants
testified for the government that the defendant
personally engaged in cocaine sales of amounts
totaling over five kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell
argued that the co-defendant's testimony was
unreliable; however, she provided no evidence
and did not testify to rebut the government's
evidence about drug quantity.
At the close of testimony at the sentencing
hearing, the district judge stated that he believe
Mitchell no longer retained a right not to testify
because she had pleaded guilty to the underlying
offense and thereby waived her Fifth
Amendment privilege. He explained that he
found that the defendant sold over five
kilograms on the basis of the defendant's failure
to come forward with evidence explaining her
involvement in the sales. The district judge then
sentenced Mithchell to the 120-month
mandatory minimum.
The Fifth Amendment precludes the
government or the court from penalizing a
defendant in any way for the use of the privilege
against self-incrimination. On the other hand, if
a defendant's testimony cannot incriminate her,
she cannot claim a Fifth Amendment privilege.
Once a defendant has been convicted by a jury
or pleaded guilty, the privilege is lost because
the defendant can no longer be incriminated by
her testimony about the crime. Thus a
defendant who has pleaded guilty to an offense
waives his privilege as to the acts constituting it.
In U.S. v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650 (CA 3
1991), we recognized that a defendant's plea of
guilty to one offense does not by its own force
waive a privilege with respect to other alleged
transgressions. We have not previously
addressed the question whether a defendant
retains a Fifth Amendment right after a guilty
plea or conviction with respect to testimony that
might negatively affect her sentence.
SLOVITER, C.J.,
We see nothing in the Fifth Amendment ("No
person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself') or in the
Supreme Court's cases construing it that
provides any basis for holding that the self-
incrimination that is precluded extends to
testimony that would have an impact on the
appropriate sentence for the crime of conviction.
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The sentence is the penalty for the very crime
of conviction, and if one could refuse to testify
regarding the sentence then that would
contravene the established principle that upon
conviction, "criminality ceases; and with
criminality the privilege." 8 Wigmore, Evidence
sec. 2279 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Similarly,
although there may be many components to be
considered in computing the sentence in the new
era of Sentencing Guidelines and statutory
sentencing directives, one cannot logically
fragment the sentencing process for this purpose
and retain the privilege against self-incrimination
as to one or more of the components. Whether
the defendant used a gun or had responsibility
for more than five kilograms of cocaine is not an
issue of independent criminality to which the
Fifth Amendment applies in sentencing. Thus,
we agree with the suggestion in Frierson that t
he privilege against self incrimination is not
implicated by testimony affecting the level of
sentence. See Frierson, 945 F.2d at 656 n.2.
Mitchell would have us find that Frierson is
inapplicable to a situation where a defendant
pled guilty but reserved the right to contest at
sentencing the amount of cocaine attributable to
her. We find that argument unpersuasive.
Mitchell opened herself up to the full range of
sentences for distributing cocaine when she was
told during her plea colloquy that the penalty for
conspiring to distribute cocaine had a maximum
of life imprisonment. While her reservation may
have put the government to its proof as to the
amount of the drugs, her declination to testify
on that issue could properly be held against her.
Unlike the witnesses who were still open to
prosecution in the series of cases referred to
above where the courts sustained the invocation
of the Fifth Amendment, Mitchell does not claim
that she could be implicated in other crimes by
testifying at her sentencing hearing, nor could
she be retried by the state for the same offense,
see 18 Pa. S.C.A. sec. 111. As the government
notes, Mitchell "was not asked to testify about
offenses outside the scope of her guilty plea,"
appellee's brief at 33, and we thus agree that
once she pled guilty to the substantive offense
she lost her Fifth Amendment privilege as to
that offense
We thus conclude that although Mitchell faced
the possibility of a harsher sentence for this drug
offense because of her failure to testify at the
sentencing hearing to counter the credibility of
[the witnesses at sentencing], in light of the fact
that she does not claim that she exposed herself
to future federal or state prosecution, the Fifth
Amendment privilege no longer was available to
her.
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JONES v. U.S.
By Darren Welch
35,000 carjackings occur every year in the United States. The increasing rate of carjackings and the
inherently dangerous nature of the crime prompted Congress to pass a federal carjacking statute. The
constitutionality and scope of that statute is now at issue and the Court must rule on the fate of
Congress' main weapon against the national carjacking problem.
The Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992 (18 U.S.C. 2119) made it a federal crime to steal a vehicle involving
a firearm, popularly known as carjacking. A 1994 amendment to the act eliminated the firearm
requirement and added provisions dealing with intent of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
relevant part of the statute reads:
Whoever, possessing a firearm ... takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence or another by force
and violence or by intimidation or attempts to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury ... results, be fined not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to
life, or both.
On December 7, 1992, defendants Donovan Oliver, Darryl McMillan, and Nathaniel Jones drove to
a liquor store in Bakersfield, California, where they encountered victims Ali Mutanna and Abdullah
Mardaie in a parked car. At gunpoint, the defendants ordered the victims out of the car and Oliver stuck
the gun barrel into Mutanna's ear, causing severe bleeding, numbness, and some hearing loss. Jones
drove away with Mutanna in Mutanna's car and was caught by police shortly thereafter.
Defendants were indicted in Federal District Court with, among other things, one count of carjacking
under 18 U.S.C. 2119. They were convicted by a jury and sentenced to the 25 year maximum.
Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.
Defendants appealed a handful of issues, most importantly that "seriously bodily injury" is an element
of the carjacking offense which must be plead and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit affirmed in part (the large part), vacated and remanded in part. The
Circuit court relied on plain language of the statute, legislative history, and federal statutory
interpretation precedent of similar sentencing provisions to reach its conclusion that subsection (1)-(3)
are merely sentencing provisions. The Ninth Circuit then affirmed the maximum sentence that the district
court imposed upon remand.
Defendants argue that it was not until the sentencing phase that they became aware that there would
be a contention that the case involved serious bodily injury. If serious bodily injury is, as defendant's
204
argue, an element of the crime, and was not raised until the sentencing phase, the conviction could not
stand. Apparently, the argument is that the language of 18 U.S C 2119 (1)-(3), enacted in 1994,
replaced the 1992 firearm requirement as a necessary element of the crime. The District Court and
Circuit Court both ruled that serious bodily injury is only a factor which it was free to consider in
sentencing defendants, not an actual element of the crime.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and later limited its review to the questions: 1) Does 18 U.S.C.
2119 (1)-(3) describe sentencing factors or elements of the offense?, 2) If 18 U.S.C. 2119 (1)-(3) sets
forth sentencing factors, is the statute constitutional?
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COURT TO HEAR CARJACKING ARGUMENTS
The Legal Intelligencer
March 31, 1998
The court also agreed yesterday to study a sweeping constitutional challenge to the federal law against
carjacking.
The justices, tackling a case from Bakersfield, Calif, said they will decide whether Nathaniel Jones'
1993 federal conviction must be thrown out. His lawyer, federal defender Quin Denver, is arguing that
the conviction cannot stand because, among other things, Jones' crime was not one Congress has
authority over.
Denvir, based in Fresno, Calif, was one of the lawyers who represented Theodore Kaczynski in the
Unabomber prosecution.
Jones and two other men were convicted of a violent carjacking in Bakersfield. The stolen car's owner
was threatened by having a gun jammed into his ear hard enough to cause bleeding and permanently
affect his hearing.
Jones was arrested by police after he drove the stolen car into a telephone pole.
He was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison for the federal crimes of carjacking and using
a gun during a violent crime. Prosecutors said one of Jones' accomplices actually wielded the gun.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Jones' conviction and sentence last year.
In the appeal acted on yesterday, Denvir relied heavily on a 1995 Supreme Court ruling that trimmed
Congress' power to attack crime through its authority over interstate commerce.
In that 1995 decision, the court said Congress lacked the authority to pass a law banning possession
of a gun within 1,000 feet of a school.
States have the primary authority to enact and enforce criminal laws, the court said then. Congress can
enact laws under its power to regulate interstate commerce only to regulate activity that "substantially"
affects such commerce, it added.
Federal prosecutors in Jones' case relied on the fact that the cariacked vehicle had been transported
in interstate commerce after being manufactured and before being sold.
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"It is hard to understand how driving a car less than a mile which has previously been shipped over a
state line has any effect on interstate commerce, let alone a substantial etect," Denvir said.
"This court should require a finding of a substantial effect on interstate commerce before a conviction
of carjacking will be sustained," the appeal said.
The case is Jones v. U.S., 97-6203.
Copyright 1998 Legal Communications, Ltd.
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PUTTING THE BRAKES ON CARJACKING OR ACCELERATING IT? THE ANTI CAR
THEFT
ACT OF 1992
University of Richmond Law Review
April, 1994
F Georgann Wing
A. Title I
1. Carjacking and Other Theft Crimes
The Act makes it a federal offense to take a motor vehicle, or attempt to take a motor vehicle, "from
the person or presence of another by force or violence or by intimidation." Federal jurisdiction lies
where the carjacker had possession of a firearm and took a motor vehicle that had "been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce" prior to the theft.
These requirements will limit federal jurisdiction. Even though the gun may be the carjacker's weapon
of choice, not all carjackers will have a gun in their possession. The carjacker will escape federal
prosecution if, instead of a gun, he had a knife or other deadly weapon, or if he was not armed.
Jurisdiction is also limited because the vehicle had to have been "transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce." In other words, the vehicle had to have crossed state lines before it was
carjacked. Furthermore, since Congress used the term "motor vehicle," the argument may be precluded
that jurisdiction is established if the vehicle's parts had crossed state lines. Therefore, carjackers who
steal motor vehicles manufactured and sold in the same state, like those manufactured and sold in
Detroit, Michigan, may avoid federal prosecution--a result that some courts will label unfair
discrimination. And would federal jurisdiction lie if the owner himself drove the car across state lines
before the carjacking?
Because of these gaps and the anticipated constitutional challenges, the states may choose to enact their
own carjacking statutes. The statutes could be broad enough to make carjacking a specific offense where
a knife or other deadly weapon was used, or where the carjacker was not armed.
The Attorney General "is urged to work with State and local officials to investigate" and prosecute
criminals for carjacking. To that end, the states may call in the FBI and have the advantage of the
Bureau's special investigational expertise. Because the states can prosecute for the crime under their
own laws--whether the crime is labeled robbery, murder, assault, or something else--the U.S. Attorney
will undoubtedly defer most carjacking prosecutions to them. In determining which jurisdiction will
prosecute, several factors may be considered, including the severity of the crime, the maximum
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punishment available in the competing jurisdictions, the sentencing guidelines, the deterrent effect, and
prison overcrowding.
For example, the U.S. Attorney may defer to the state in situations where the victim was not seriously
injured, where the carjacker is a juvenile, where the death penalty is available, and where the federal
punishment guidelines would provide no more punishment than would the state. However, the U.S.
Attorney may decide to take jurisdiction in cases where the FBI has investigated, where there are assets
that may be seized in forfeiture, where gangs are involved, and where (because of the deterrent effect)
the U.S. Attorney is asked to prosecute or the crime has received extensive media coverage.
If sufficiently provided, federal investigation, prosecution, and incarceration of cajackers will give the
states some badly needed relief It may also mean that carjackers will serve more time. And when the
word gets around that carjacking is now a federal offense, thieves may pause and take their crimes
elsewhere.
The final legislation extended the maximum imprisonment of 15 years for armed carjacking to 25 years
if serious injury occurs, and "up to life" in prison if death results. The Act doubles the maximum
imprisonment for other theft crimes, from five years to ten years, and it provides civil and criminal
forfeiture sanctions for enumerated violations, including armed robbery of motor vehicles. The Act
defines the term "chop shop" and imposes a maximum 15-year sentence for the first conviction of
"knowingly" owning, operating, maintaining, or controlling a chop shop or conducting "operations in
a chop shop."
Copyright (C) 1994 by the University of Richmond Law Revieiw Association: F
Georgann Wing (footnotes omitted)
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THE FEDERAL CARJACKING STATUTE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE? AN ANALYSIS OF
THE PROPRIETY OF 18 U.S.C. S 2119
Saint Louis University Law Journal
Spring 1995
Mary C. Michenfelder
I. Introduction
ON September 8, 1992, Pamela Basu, a thirty-four-year old Maryland woman, was dragged to her
death after two men forced her from her car and drove off with her twenty-two-month old daughter. Ms.
Basu was caught in the safety belt of her BMW and was dragged for a mile and a half before she was
dislodged from the car. The child, still strapped in her car seat, was thrown from the car shortly after
the carjacking but was unhurt. Although carjackings occur at a rate of 35,000 per year, it was this
particularly heinous crime which prompted Congress to federalize armed carjacking as part of the Anti
Car Theft Act of 1992.
The federal offense of carjacking requires the taking of a motor vehicle from another while in
possession of a firearm. When prosecuting these cases, United States Attorneys across the country
charge defendants with the offense of carjacking as well as the offense of using or carrying a firearm in
relation to a crime of violence. When convicted of these offenses, defendants face terms of
imprisonment under both the carjacking statute and the gun statute These double punishments raise the
question of double jeopardy, that is, that a defendant is being punished twice for the same conduct.
Various federal district courts have found these double punishments to violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution, while other district courts have determined that Congress intended there to
be double punishment, which is permissible provided there is a clear congressional statement to that
effect. A number of federal circuit courts have found a clear intent by Congress to twice punish this
conduct. However, a close examination of the statutes and their legislative history reveals no such clear
intent.
In May 1993, Congress began various debates relating to the carjacking statute, none of which involved
the double jeopardy question raised by the conflicting court decisions throughout the country. The
congressional debates revolved around two questions: 1) should carjackers be subject to the death
penalty when their crime results in death and 2) should the firearm requirement be eliminated from the
statute. Although one would assume the second question was raised in response to the double jeopardy
problem, such is not the case. Congress acknowledged that violent robberies of automobiles can occur
without a firearm, but concerns were raised that taking the firearm completely out of carjacking would
dilute the already attenuated nexus between carjacking and interstate commerce, Congress' authority to
enact the statute. The legislative history points to a compromise to eliminate the firearm element from
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the statute at least as it relates to carjacking resulting in death. The question of double jeopardy was
never raised.
The year-long debates culminated in a one-line amendment to the carjacking statute, which was enacted
into law in September 1994 as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. While it
is undisputed that the statute now provides for the death penalty when carjacking results in death, the
remainder of the statute, as amended, is subject to various interpretations. One may read the amendment
to have taken the firearm out of the crime completely and to require the carjacker to intend to cause
death or do serious bodily injury, regardless of the outcome of the crime. A more plausible reading,
however, both deletes the firearm element and requires the intent element only when the carjacking
results in death. This reading is consistent with the legislative history and with the literal reading of the
amendment. The question of double jeopardy remains intact, however, for the offense still requires
possession of a firearm when the carjacking does not result in death.
In addition to its ambiguity and the constitutional challenges it faces, the carjacking statute violates the
ever-decreasing notion of federalism. Carjacking is predominantly a state crime and states have proven
successful in its prosecution and punishment. An examination of the crime of carjacking and its impact
upon federal courts reveals no clear need for federal presence to combat this state crime.
Copyright (C) 1995 St. Louis University School of Law; Mary C. Michenfe/der (footnotes omitted)
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97-6203 JONES v. U.S.
First ruling below (U.S. v. Oliver, CA 9, 60 F.3d 547, 64 LW 2052, 57 CrL 1334):
U.S. v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 (CA9 1995), forecloses defendant's contention that Double Jeopardy
Clause bars his convictions, stemming from his use of gun in carjacking, under both 18 USC 2119, which
prohibits forcible taking of car that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign
commerce, and 18 USC 924(c), which forbids use of firearm during crime of violence; Section 2119 is
within Congress' power under Commerce Clause, in order to sustain carjacking conviction under aiding
and abetting theory, prosecution need not prove that defendant actually possessed firearm, but must
instead prove only that defendant knew that co-defendant had and intended to use firearm during
carijacking, and that defendant intended to aid in that endeavor, for which there was ample evidence in
this case.
Second ruling below (U.S. v. Oliver, CA 9, 6/27/97, unpublished):
Resentencing upon remand to maximum sentence allowed by remand order is affirmed.
Questions presented: (1) Did Ninth Circuit violate petitioner's right to due process by sentencing him
to maximum term when he had no notice that he was facing such term? (2) Was conduct attributed to
petitioner in trial sufficient evidence of substantial effect on interstate commerce such that it would
invoke Congress' authority under Commerce Clause? (3) Did petitioner's conviction violate Fifth
Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy?
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
Donovan Dwayne OLIVER, et all., Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Dec. 12, 1994.
Decided July 6, 1995.
MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:
Defendants Donovan Dwayne Oliver, Darryl
Lee McMillan, and Nathaniel Jones appeal their
convictions and sentences for caracking/aiding
and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
2119, and using a firearm during a crime of
violence/aiding and abetting, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, and
vacate and remand in part.
I.
Background
The evidence at trial disclosed the following
facts: On December 7, 1992, Oliver, Jones and
McMillan drove to a liquor store in Bakersfield,
California. In the liquor store parking lot, they
approached Ali Nassar Mutanna and Abdullah
Mardaie, who were in Mardaie's parked car.
After ordering Mutanna and Mardaie out of the
car, Oliver held them at gunpoint. Oliver stuck
the barrel of his firearm into Mutanna's left ear
and held it there to ensure that Mutanna would
not move, causing Mutanna's ear to bleed
profusely. Meanwhile, Jones and McMillan
searched Mutanna's and Mardaie's pockets.
Oliver then forced Mutanna behind the liquor
store, ordered him to lie on the ground, and
struck him in the head while he was lying there.
Oliver told Mutanna that Oliver would kill him
if he moved. Oliver then got into Jones' car,
which was being driven by McMillan, and fired
a shot as they drove away.
Jones had forced Mardaie into Mutanna's car,
and Jones followed Oliver and McMillan as they
left the scene. After they travelled a short
distance, Jones ordered Mardaie out of the car.
After defendants left, Mutanna flagged down a
police car. Police officers located Mutanna's car
a few blocks away from the liquor store. Jones
fled in Mutanna's car when he noticed the police
car approaching. After a short car chase, Jones
crashed Mutanna's car and was apprehended.
Jones' car was also located nearby, with the gun
used by Oliver in the back seat. Oliver and
McMillan were arrested shortly thereafter.
Defendants were indicted on December 30,
1992, with one count of carjacking/aiding and
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
2119, and one count of using a firearm during a
crime of violence/aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c). On July
29, 1993, defendants were convicted by a jury
on all counts Defendants were sentenced under
the 25-year (300 months) statutory maximum
set forth in § 2 119(2), because Mutanna
suffered serious bodily injury during the crime.
Defendants were each sentenced to a total of
300 months on the carjacking count and a
consecutive 60 months for the use of a weapon.
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Defendants timely appealed their sentences and
convictions on December 17, 1993.
III.
Commerce Clause
Defendants contend that Congress exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause in enacting
the carjacking statute, because carjacking is not
sufficiently related to interstate commerce. We
recently rejected this argument in United States
v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th
Cir. 1995). In so ruling, we joined with every
other circuit court that had addressed the
question.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, (1995), does
not alter our view. In Lopez, the Supreme Court
held that Congress exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause when it made it a federal
offense for a person to possess a firearm within
1000 feet of a school. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(q).
The Court noted that "§ 922(q) contains no
jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through a case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
possession in question affects interstate
commerce." Id. at 1631. It also explained that
the statute does not seek to protect "an
instrumentality of interstate commerce." Id. at
1630. Finally, the Court pointed out that there
was no showing of a substantial effect of the
prohibited activity on interstate commerce, and
Congress had made no findings that there was
such an effect. Id. at 1631-32.
The carjacking statute has a very different
background. First, it applies only to the forcible
taking of a car "that has been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Second, cars
are themselves instrumentalities of commerce,
which Congress may protect. See United States
v. Watson, 815 F.Supp. 827, 831
(E.D.Pa. 1993).
Lastly, we note that Congress was not silent
regarding the effect of carjacking on interstate
commerce As we stated in Martinez, Congress
relied on, among other things, "the emergence
of carjacking as a 'high-growth industry' that
involves taking stolen vehicles to different states
to retitle, exporting vehicles abroad, or selling
cars to 'chop shops' to distribute various auto
parts for sale." Martinez, 49 F.3d at 1400 n. 2
(citing legislative history). That Congress was
addressing economic evils of an interstate nature
differentiates the carjacking statute from the
firearms statute invalidated in Lopez. "The
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce." Lopez, ---
U.S. at----, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. Carjacking, on
the other hand, is exactly that sort of economic
activity, as Congress clearly concluded. We
accept that conclusion, and accordingly reject
the defendants' contention.
V
Double Jeopardy
Defendants contend that their convictions under
§ 2119 and § 924(c) violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause because both statutes punish
the same conduct. This argument is also
foreclosed by our recent opinion in United
States v. Martinez, 49 F 3d at 1402.
V I.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendant Jones argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support his carjacking
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conviction under the aiding and abetting theory.
Although Jones moved for judgment of acquittal
at the close of the government's case, he did not
renew the motion at the close of all evidence.
We therefore review for plain error. United
States v. Ramirez, 880 F.2d 236, 238 (9th
Cir. 1989).
Relying on United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d
1192 (9th Cir. 1992), Jones contends that he was
not properly convicted of carjacking because
there was no evidence that he possessed a
firearm. Dinkane involved a conviction for
armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d),
an aggravated form of bank robbery under 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a). We noted that to sustain a §
2113(d) conviction for an aider and abettor, the
government must show not only that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally aided the
act of bank robbery, but also the commission of
the aggravating element. Id. at 1197. We
therefore concluded that the defendant get-away
driver could not be convicted of armed bank
robbery under an aiding and abetting theory
where there was no evidence that he knew--
before or during the bank robbery--that the
robbers had and intended to use weapons. Id. at
1198.
Contrary to Jones' contention, Dinkane does
not require that the government prove that he
actually possessed the firearm. Dinkane only
requires proof that Jones knew that a co-
defendant had and intended to use the firearm
during a carjacking, and intended to aid in that
endeavor. There was ample evidence of this.
The evidence demonstrated that, on the evening
of the carjacking, Jones, Oliver and McMillan
drove to a liquor store in Jones' car. Oliver
testified that when he got into Jones' car, he
noticed a gun on the floor of the back seat.
Mutanna testified that when defendants
approached him in the liquor store parking lot,
he could see that Oliver was carrying a gun.
Oliver held Mutanna and Mardaie at gunpoint,
while Jones and McMillan rifled their pockets.
Oliver also used his gun to keep Mutanna
behind the store, and fired a shot from Jones'
car, as Jones escaped in the Mutanna's car. A
reasonable jury could have easily concluded
from these facts that Jones knew Oliver had a
firearm, that Jones knew Oliver intended to use
the firearm during the carjacking, and that Jones
intended to and did aid in that endeavor. Jones'
conviction was not plain error.
VIll.
Serious Bodily Injury
Defendants also argue that "serious bodily
injury" as set forth in § 21 19(2) is an element of
the carjacking offense which must be pleaded in
the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. Defendants point out that it was
not until the sentencing phase that they became
aware that there would be a contention that the
case involved serious bodily injury for purposes
of § 2119(2). The district court concluded that
serious bodily injury is a factor which it was free
to consider in sentencing defendants. We agree
with the district court.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
key to distinguishing between elements of an
offense and sentencing factors is the legislature's
definition of the elements of the offense.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85, 106
S.Ct. 2411, 2415-16 (1986). We therefore must
look to the plain language and structure of the
statute. United States v. Young, 936 F.2d
1050, 1054 (9th Cir.1991). The carjacking
statute, 1 8 U.S C. § 2 1 19, reads as follows:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in
section 92 1 of this title, takes a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped, or received
in interstate or foreign commerce from the
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person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation or attempts to do
so, shall--
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both,
(2) (2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in
section 1365 of this title) results, be fined
not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any number of years up to life,
or both.
In United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004,
1011 (11th Cir.1995), the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that "Congress[ ] inten[ded] that
subparagraphs (2) and (3) be treated as
sentencing enhancement features, and not
elements of the offense." According to the
Eleventh Circuit, the natural reading of the text-
-in which the crime of carjacking is defined in
the first paragraph and the subparagraphs simply
set forth different degrees of sentencing--
suggests that the subparagraphs are sentencing
provisions. Id. We agree with the Eleventh
Circuit and conclude that the serious bodily
injury and death language in § 2119 exist for
sentence enhancement purposes. The plain text
of the statute establishes one offense, as defined
in the first main paragraph. That definition of
the offense is set apart by a comma, followed by
the word "shall" and then three sentencing
possibilities. This does not establish three
separate, substantive offenses.
Our decision in United States v. Young, 936
F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.1991), is instructive. In that
case, we determined that the weapon provision
of 18 U.S.C. § 111 is a sentencing factor, rather
than an element of the crime of assaulting a
federal officer. The statute under which the
defendant was convicted read as follows:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes,
impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person designated in section 1114 of this title
while engaged in or on account of the
performance of his official duties, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than three (3) years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of such acts uses
a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined
not more than ten (10) years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § Ill (amended 1988). In
concluding that Congress intended the weapon
provision to be a sentencing factor, we noted
that it was not "structurally separated from the
rest of the section, indicating that the section
contains only one substantive offense." Young,
936 F.2d at 1054. Moreover, the "weapon
provision [was] not drafted as a stand-alone
offense, it incorporate[d] the predicate acts by
reference rather than affirmatively setting forth
any specific elements." Id., Similarly, Congress
did not enact § 2 119 and its subparts in
"structurally separate" provisions. It did not
redefine the essential elements of cariacking in
subparagraphs (1), (2) or (3), and those
provisions could not stand alone, independent of
the main paragraph. These factors lead to the
conclusion that § 2119 sets forth one offense,
with several possible penalties.
Defendants argue that Young is distinguishable
because, in a subsequent amendment, the
weapon provision of § Ill was specifically
labeled "Enhanced Penalty," and therefore
Congressional intent is clear. It is true that in
Young we found this subsequent amendment to
have "persuasive value," Young, 936 F.2d at
1054. But we have similar persuasive evidence
of congressional intent in this case. Section
2119 was adopted as part of the overall "Anti-
Car Theft Act of 1992" (the "Act"), enacted at
a time when carjacking crimes were increasing
at an alarming rate. See Public Law 102-519,
102nd Congress, 106 STAT 3384 (1992). In
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the Act, § 2119 and its subparagraphs come
directly under the title, "Tougher Law
Enforcement Against Auto Theft," and the
subtitle, "Enhanced Penalties for Auto Theft."
Id. (emphasis added). Clearly the title, and
undoubtedly the subtitle, suggest an intent that
§ 2119 set forth enhanced penalties. Other
portions of the legislative history suggest the
While defendants were not informed through
the indictment or at arraignment that they were
facing the 25-year maximum, this omission does
not amount to a due process violation. See,
e.g., Young, 936 F.2d at 1053 (indictment need
not plead sentencing factor); LaMere v. Risley,
827 F.2d 622, 624 (9th Cir. 1987) (notice in the
information that government will seek sentence
enhancement not necessary); United States v.
Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.) (prior
violent felonies used for sentence enhancement
need not be charged in indictment or proved at
trial), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 950, 112 S.Ct. 401
(1991). The evidence at trial suggested that
Mutanna suffered injury. The probation
department reported in the presentence report
that Mutanna suffered a perforated eardrum,
causing numbness and some hearing loss, and
defendants were given medical reports on the
condition. Defendants concede that they were
given an opportunity to contest the issue at
sentencing. We note that defendants have never
demonstrated that the information in the
presentence report was inaccurate, or that the
district court erred in determining that Mutanna
suffered serious bodily injury. Having
concluded that serious bodily injury is not an
element of the offense, we are compelled to find
that defendants received sufficient process for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED and
REMANDED in part.
same conclusion. In fact, nothing in our review
of the Act or its legislative history even remotely
indicates that Congress intended that serious
bodily injury and death be additional carjacking
elements which must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial.
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HOLLOWAY v. U.S.
By Darren Welch
This challenge raises the issue of whether the federal carjacking statute requires specific intent to
seriously injure the victim or conditional intent to injure the victim only if she refuses to give up her
vehicle. If this challenge is successful, all carjackers that are willing to let compliant victims go
unharmed will be beyond the reach of the statute.
The Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992 (18 U.S.C.A. 2119) made it a federal crime to steal a vehicle
involving a firearm, popularly known as carjacking. A 1994 amendment to the act eliminated the firearm
provision and added provisions dealing with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
exact implications of the 1994 amendment (whether the changes make a new element of the crime or just
a sentencing factor) is the subject of another case to be heard by the Supreme Court this term, Jones v.
U.S. 97-6203.
Defendant Francois Holloway and his partner-in-crime Vernon Lennon, son of chop-shop owner and
co-defendant Teddy Arnold, were prosecuted for three carjacking incidents in which Holloway and
Lennon stole cars at gunpoint to give to Arnold to supply his chop-shop. During each of the three
incidents, Vernon, accompanied by Holloway, pointed his gun at the victims and demanded the keys to
their vehicle. Vernon used threats of violence, such as "Get out of the car or I'll shoot" and one victim
was punched in the face after hesitating to give the keys over to the carjackers. At trial, Lennon testified
that, even though no shots were fired during any of the incidents, he would have used the gun if one of
the victims had given him a "hard time." Lennon insisted, however, that he did not intend to seriously
injure the victims. He claimed he only wanted their vehicles. The Eastern District Court of New York
convicted Holloway of, among other things, three counts of violating statute 18 U.S.C.A. 2119. District
Court Judge Gleeson noted that the purpose of the 1994 amendment to the statute was to broaden its
reach and to rule that only a specific intent to cause bodily injury satisfies the statute would be
inconsistent with Congress' intent. Gleeson, citing hornbook law, also asserted that conditional intent
satisfies a particular required intention "unless the condition negatives the evil sought to be prevented
by the statute." Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a new trial and for reconsideration of his denied
motion to set aside the verdict.
Holloway raised on appeal that the intent element of the statute was not satisfied by Lennon's threats
to shoot if the victims did not give up their vehicle. Holloway contends that the language of the statute
("with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm") is satisfied only by specific intent to cause death
or serious bodily harm. Holloway contends his intent to cause death or serious bodily harm was
conditioned upon the victim not giving up the vehicle, and conditional intent, which Holloway argues
is lesser than specific intent, is insufficient to satisfy the statute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court held that
intent to kill conditioned on the victim's refusal to surrender their vehicle satisfied the intent element of
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the statute. Writing for the majority, Judge Scullin argued that to literally apply the text of the statute
would cause a result that is contrary to what Congress intended, namely, prosecuting all armed
carjackers. Scullin noted that the Third Circuit has speculated that Congress probably intended the
statute to apply only to cases where death resulted. Despite this, the Holloway court ruled that since
death is clearly foreseeable and planned for in case the carjacking goes badly, the defendants exhibited
a sufficiently culpable mental state to satisfy the statute.
Holloway v. U.S. is significant because a Supreme Court reversal would mean a large number of
carjackers (all but those those who intend to seriously injure or kill their victims regardless of the
outcome of the carjacking) would not be subject to federal prosecution. Given the serious nature of the
crime, a reversal would be a major setback to deterring and punishing carjackers.
Clinton administration attorneys had urged the Supreme Court to reject Holloway's appeal.
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HIGH COURT TO WEIGH STATUTE ON INTENT TO H-ARM IN CARJACKINGS
The Buffalo News
April 28, 1998, NIAGARA EDITION
Richard Carelli; Associated Press
The Supreme Court said Monday that it will decide whether people who steal vehicles at gunpoint can
avoid prosecution under a federal carjacking law by insisting that they never intended to seriously injure
anyone.
Attorneys for Francois Holloway, sentenced to more than 50 years in prison for a series of carjackings,
contend that the law used to prosecute him has a loophole big enough to drive a truck through.
They argue that lower courts misread the federal law by concluding that it covers crimes committed
with "conditional intent" to harm victims who refuse to comply with the robber's demands.
The law makes it a crime to take a motor vehicle by force "with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm."
The federal judge who presided over Holloway's trial told jurors that they could find such intent if they
thought that Holloway would have seriously hurt victims who did not surrender their cars. The jury then
convicted him.
The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, ruling that such a common-sense
interpretation was valid despite the law's ambiguous language.
Holloway's appeal, which should yield a ruling by the nation's highest court sometime next year,
contends that the appeals court ruling violated "fundamental principles of statutory construction" and,
as a result, his due-process rights.
Holloway was convicted for his part in a carjacking ring that sold parts from stolen vehicles dismantled
in a New York City "chop shop."
Prosecutors said Holloway, on several occasions in the fall of 1994, confronted motorists with a gun
and demanded that they surrender their car keys.
Clinton administration attorneys had urged the justices to reject the appeal.
Copyright 1998 The Buffalo News
220
JUDGE DEFINES INTENT ELEMENT IN CARJACK LAW:
CONGRESS'S 'CARELESSNESS' IN REDRAFTING CRITICIZED
New York Law Journal
April 16, 1996
Bill Alden
REFUSING TO limit the scope of the federal carjacking statute, a Brooklyn federal judge has ruled
that a defendant need not have an "unconditional" intent to kill or seriously injure in order to be subject
to prosecution under the law.
In rejecting a Queens man's argument that his carjacking convictions should be set aside since his
accomplice only planned to shoot their victims if they gave the men a "hard time," Eastern District Judge
John Gleeson declared that such a reading of the law would produce the "odd result" of "no longer
prohibiting the very crime it was enacted to address."
When Congress originally enacted the Anti Car Theft Act in 1992, possession of a firearm was included
as a necessary element. Two years later, in an attempt to broaden the reach of the law, Judge Gleeson
noted, Congress deleted the firearm requirement and replaced it with language providing that the law
applied to those having the "intent to cause death or serious injury'"
Although he ultimately rebuffed the proposed literal interpretation, Judge Gleeson faulted Congress for
creating the anomoly in the statute which the defendant, Francois Holloway (also known as Abdu Ali),
seized upon.
"Carelessness in the legislative process has produced a criminal statute that says something
fundamentally different than what Congress obviously meant to say," wrote Judge Gleeson in his 15-page
ruling in U.S. v. Holloway.
"As a result, Ali advances a colorable claim that his conduct here - using a gun to terrorize motorists
into giving up their cars - is no longer prohibited by the carjacking statute. Indeed, it is likely that a 1994
amendment to the statute, which was explicitly intended to broaden the available penalties, in fact placed
a large number of 'carjackers' beyond its reach."
Vernon Lennon, whose father ran a Queens "chop shop," recruited Mr. Ali to help him steal cars to
supply to the shop. Mr. Ali was to receive a fixed fee for each car stolen.
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The two men stole cars from three people at gunpoint in mid-October 1994. Mr. Lennon pulled the
gun in each of the incidents. Although no shots were fired during the thefts, Mr. Ali admitted that he
knew that Mr. Lennon planned to shoot any victim who put up resistance.
In addition, Mr. Ali acknowledged punching one of the motorists in the face when he was slow to
cooperate.
After being convicted of three counts of carjacking by a Brooklyn federal jury last December, Mr. Ali
moved for a new trial on the grounds that the law should not apply to him since his true intent was not
to kill or injure people, but to just to steal cars.
While conceding that this reading of the statute had some validity and could actually set some carjackers
free, Judge Gleeson concluded that Mr. Ali was "not among them."
Invoking hornbook law and the Model Penal Code, Judge Gleeson found that Mr. Ali's intent to aid
and abet Mr. Lennon's potential use of the firearm was enough to satisfy the intent element of the law.
"Where a crime is defined to require a particular intention, that element is satisfied even if the requisite
intent is conditional, unless the condition negatives the evil sought to be prevented by the statute," wrote
Judge Gleeson, citing the Handbook on Criminal Law by W.R. Lafave and A. W Scott.
Moreover, noting that this principle has been incorporated into s2.02 (6) of the Model Penal Code,
Judge Gleeson asserted that "the conditional nature of Ali's intent obviously does not help him." The
evil sought to be prevented by the carjacking law, he added, is not negated by the condition, "it is the
condition."
In Judge Gleeson's view, there was "ample evidence" from which a jury could infer Mr. Ali's intent to
seriously injure or kill pursuant to the statute notwithstanding his avowed plan only to steal cars.
"Lennon intended to shoot uncooperative victims, and threatened to do so in Ali's presence," explained
Judge Gleeson. "Ali himself demonstrated a seriousness of purpose by punching one of the victims in
the face simply because he hesitated in handing over his money."
The defendant, he said, "makes much of the fact that there is no direct evidence of his intent, but there
rarely is such evidence. The jury could have readily inferred it from the circumstances."
Dana Hanna of Brooklyn represented Mr. Ali. Assistant Eastern District U.S. Attorney Dolan L.
Garrett represented the government.
Copyright 1996 by the New York Law Publishing Company
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97-7164 HOLLO WAYv. U.S.
Ruling below (U.S. v. Arnold, CA 2, 126 F.3d 82, 62 CrL 1039):
Carjacker's intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm only if carjacking victim refuses to surrender his
or her car satisfies provision of federal carjacking statute, 18 USC 2119, that requires carjacker to have
'intent to cause death or serious bodily harm' in order to be culpable.
Question presented: Does court of appeals holding that conditional intent is included within legal
definition of specific intent in amended carjacking statute violate both fundamental principles of statutory
construction and petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law?
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
V.
Teddy ARNOLD, et all., Defendant-Appellant
No. 1877, Docket 96-1563.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued June 25, 1997.
Decided Sept. 16, 1997.
Defendant convicted of various offenses,
including carjacking, moved for new trial and for
reconsideration of unsuccessful motion to set
aside verdict. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, John
Gleeson, J., denied motion, 921 F.Supp. 155,
and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Scullin, District Judge, sitting by designation,
held that: (1) defendant's intent to kill victims
conditioned on their failure to surrender car
could satisfy specific intent to kill requirement to
federal carjacking statute, and (2) defense
counsel's strategy of conceding other elements
of offense and raising defense that defendant
lacked specific intent was reasonable and was
not ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
SCULLIN, District Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Francois Holloway
appeals from a judgment entered in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Gleeson, J.), following a jury trial,
convicting Holloway of numerous offenses
connected with his participation in several
carjackings in Queens, New York. Holloway
was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
operate a "chop shop" in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (count one); one count of operating a
chop shop in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2322
(count two); three counts of carjacking in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (counts seven,
nine, and eleven); and three counts of using a
firearm in the commission of a crime of violence
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (counts eight,
ten, and twelve). Holloway was sentenced to 60
months on count one; 151 months on count
two, to run concurrently with count one; 151
months on each of counts seven, nine, and
eleven, to run concurrently with each other and
counts one and two; 5 years on count eight, to
run consecutively; and 20 years each on count
ten and count twelve, each to run consecutively.
Defendant was also sentenced to terms of
supervised release and a special assessment of
$400.
On appeal, Holloway contends that: (1) the
district court erroneously charged the jury on
the intent element of the carjacking statute; (2)
his trial counsel rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court
improperly imposed consecutive sentences
pursuant to Holloway's firearm convictions.
BACKGROUND
Holloway's conviction stems from his
involvement in a "chop shop" operation located
at 115th Drive in Queens, New York. In
September I994, Teddy Arnold recruited his
son, Vernon Lennon, to begin stealing cars to be
taken to the chop shop for dismantling. Lennon,
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in turn, recruited two individuals, David
Valentine and Holloway, to assist him in his car
thefts. The co-conspirators agreed that they
should use a firearm during their thefts, and
Lennon showed both Valentine and Holloway a
.32 caliber revolver he intended to use for that
purpose.
The first charged carjacking involving Holloway
and Lennon occurred in October 1994. On
October 14, Holloway and Lennon followed a
1992 Nissan Maxima driven by sixty-nine year-
old Stanley Metzger. When Metzger stopped
and parked across from his residence, Lennon
approached Metzger and pointed his revolver at
him, demanding his car keys. At first, Metzger
gave his house keys to Lennon, who rejected
them and demanded his car keys. Metzger
testified that Lennon told him, "I have a gun. I
am going to shoot." Thereafter, Metzger
surrendered his keys and also his money, and
Lennon drove away in the Maxima.
The following day, Lennon and Holloway
followed a 1991 Toyota Celica driven by Donna
DiFranco. When DiFranco parked, Lennon
approached her, leveled his gun at her, and
demanded her money and her car keys. After
DiFranco disengaged the car alarm and unlocked
her "club" securing the steering wheel, Lennon
drove off in her car.
That same day, Holloway and Lennon followed
a 1988 Mercedes-Benz driven by Ruben
Rodriguez until he parked near his home at
Jamaica Estates. Both Lennon and Holloway
approached the driver this time. Rodriguez,
sensing something was wrong, retreated to his
car. Lennon produced his gun and threatened,
"Get out of the car or I'll shoot." Rodriguez
complied and Lennon demanded his money and
car keys. When Rodriguez hesitated, Holloway
punched him in the face. Rodriguez surrendered
the items and fled on foot, yelling for help.
Lennon drove off in the Mercedes, and
Holloway followed in another car.
At trial, the Government also presented
evidence of two additional uncharged
carjackings involving Lennon and Holloway.
One involved the theft of a 1987 Nissan Maxima
which was stolen from Betty Eng as she parked
in her driveway on October 12, 1994. The other
uncharged carjacking occurred on October 19,
1994. On that day, Holloway and Lennon
attempted to steal a 1994 Nissan Sentra from
Sara Markett when she parked her car on 193rd
Street in Queens. Lennon threatened Markett,
telling her, "Give me your keys or I will shoot
you right now.' Thereafter, Markett
surrendered her keys and ran screaming into a
nearby hair salon. The theft was foiled by an
off-duty police officer, Adam Lamboy, who
happened to be in the hair salon at that time.
Upon seeing Lennon in Markett's car, Lamboy
yelled, "Police, don't move." Lennon made a
motion toward his waist band prompting
Lamboy to draw his weapon. Lennon then fled
to a red Toyota driven by Holloway, and the
two escaped
On November 22, 1994, two of the carjacking
victims, Ruben Rodriguez and Sara Markett,
identified Holloway as one of the carjackers in a
police line-up. Following his identification,
Holloway confessed to the police that he had
participated with Lennon in three carjackings
involving a silver Mercedes-Benz, a black
Nissan Maxima, and a gray Nissan. Immediately
prior to trial, Lennon pled guilty to several
carjacking charges and eight automatic teller
machine ("ATM") robberies. Thereafter,
Lennon testified at trial as a government
witness. Lennon testified as to the events set
forth in the above carjackings, as well as seven
additional caijackings in which he participated
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with Valentine. Lennon testified that his plan
was to steal the victims' cars without harming
the victims; however, Lennon also testified that
he would have used the gun if one of the victims
had given him "a hard time" or had resisted.
The Government also presented testimony at
trial from Rodriguez, Metzger, DiFranco, Eng,
and Lamboy. These witnesses presented
factually consistent testimony depicting the
various carjackings as set forth above. With the
exception of Rodriguez, none of the victims was
injured during the course of the carjackings, and
Rodriguez did not require medical attention.
The defense declined to call any witnesses.
Over the objection of defense counsel, Judge
Gleeson charged the jury on the doctrine of
conditional intent, as it applied to the intent
element for the carjacking offenses. Judge
Gleeson instructed the jury that an intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm conditioned
on whether the victims surrendered their cars
was sufficient to satisfy the specific intent
requirement of the statute. As stated, the jury
found Holloway guilty on all eight counts
charged in the indictment.
Following the verdict, Holloway moved for a
new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in the
alternative, for reconsideration of his
unsuccessful Rule 29 motion. See United States
v. Holloway, 921 F.Supp. 155, 156
(E.D.N.Y. 1996). Holloway argued that the
Court erred in charging the jury on conditional
intent in light of the carjacking statute's
unambiguous specific intent requirement, which
requires a carjacker to have the intent to cause
death or serious bodily harm in order to be
culpable.
In a decision issued on April 5, 1996, Judge
Gleeson denied Holloway's post- trial motion.
On August 16, 1996, Holloway was sentenced,
and, on August 28, 1996, judgment of
conviction was entered. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Conditional Intent Instruction
Holloway maintains that Judge Gleeson
committed reversible error by charging the jury
on the doctrine of "conditional intent."
Holloway contends that: (1) the federal
carjacking statute clearly and unambiguously
requires that a defendant possess a specific
intent to cause death or serious bodily harm
(hereinafter "specific intent to kill"), and (2)
conditional intent, by definition, does not satisfy
this requirement.
A. 1994 Amendments to the Cajacking Statute
Holloway argues that the statute, as amended,
is clear and unambiguous on its face, thus
preventing the trial court, or this Court for that
matter, from inquiring into the intent of
Congress or ascribing some alternate
construction of the statute based on any
perceived error in drafting. See Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701-
02, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981) Prior to the 1994
Amendments, the federal carjacking statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2119, read as follows:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in
section 92 1 of this title, takes a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped, or received
in interstate or foreign commerce from the
person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do
so, shall--
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in
section 1365 of this title, including any
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conduct that, if the conduct occurred in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, would violate section 2241
or 2242 of this title) results, be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more that 25 years,
or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any number of years up to
life, or both.
The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 amended this statute
in the following manner:
(14) CARJACKING.--Section 2119(3) of title
18, United States Code, is amended by
striking the period after "both" and inserting ",
or sentenced to death."; and by striking ",
possessing a firearm as defined in section 921
of this title," and inserting ", with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm".
Pub.L. 103-322, § 60003(a)(14). With these
revisions, the statute now reads:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that
has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the
person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do
so, shall--
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in
section 1365 of this title, including any
conduct that, if the conduct occurred in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, would violate section 2241
or 2242 of this title) results, be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more that 25 years,
or both, and
(4) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any number of years up to
life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1997) (emphasis added).
The amendments to the carjacking statute
contained in the Violent Crime Control and
Enforcement Law Act of 1994 came about as an
attempt to expand the number of federal crimes
subject to the death penalty. See 140 Cong.
Rec. E857-03 (statement of Rep. Franks); 140
Cong. Rec. S12421-01, S12458 (statement of
Sen. Nunn), 139 Cong. Rec. S15295-01, 15301
(statement of Sen. Lieberman). The thrust of
the various early versions of the amendments
was to add the death penalty as a sentencing
option when death resulted from a carjacking,
and also, in some versions, to eliminate the
firearm requirement. See H.R. 4197, 103rd
Cong. § 125(h) (1994) (removed firearm
requirement and added death penalty); H.R.
3355, 103rd Cong. § 203(a)(15) (1993) (version
as of October 19, 1993 removed the firearm
requirement and added death penalty); H.R.
3355, 103rd Cong. § 703(e) (1994) (version as
of April 21, 1994 added the death penalty only).
Congressional opposition to the amendments
coalesced into two camps: those who opposed
the death penalty in general, and those who
opposed the expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction. See 140 Cong. Rec. S12309-02,
S12311 (statement of Sen. Leahy contained in
Conference Report on H.R. 3355); 140 Cong.
Rec. H2322-02, H2325 (statement by Rep.
Glickman on amendment introduced by Rep.
Scott to remove the death penalty addition to
the Violent Crime Control Act).
The insertion of the heightened intent
requirement at issue here occurred at a relatively
late stage in the legislative process--while the
Act was under consideration in Conference
Committee in the summer of 1994. See 140
Cong. Rec. H8772-03, H8819, H8872
(Conference Report on H.R. 3355 dated August
21, 1994). On September 13, 1994, the Act was
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signed into law. There is no indication in the
Congressional Record as to the purpose of the
late-added heightened intent requirement.
However, it is clear from a review of legislative
history that Congress intended to broaden the
coverage of the federal carjacking statute by the
passage of the 1994 amendments, and that the
application of the heightened intent requirement
to all three of the carjacking categories was, in
all likelihood, an unintended drafting error. See
139 Cong. Rec. S15295-01, 15301 (statement
of Sen. Lieberman) ("This amendment will
broaden and strengthen that law so our U.S.
attorneys have every possible tool available to
them to attack the problem."); 140 Cong. Rec.
E857-03, E858 (extension of remarks by Rep.
Franks) ("We must send a message to the
criminal that committing a violent crime will
carry a severe penalty. This legislation will
make an additional 22 crimes including
carjacking and drive-by shootings, subject to the
death penalty.").
At least two courts have speculated that
Congress probably intended the heightened
intent requirement to apply only to cases where
the carjacking resulted in death, that is, those
cases falling under § 2119(3). See United States
v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 482-83 (3d
Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed (U.S., June 3,
1997) (No. 96-9338); Holloway, 921 F.Supp.
at 158. But see United States v. Randolph, 93
F.3d 656, 660-61 (9th Cir.1996). In support of
this interpretation, these courts point to the
initial wording of the 1994 amendment, "Section
2119(3) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by ....," as limiting language for the
two specific changes set forth within. See
Anderson, 108 F.3d at 478-79 (quoting Pub.L.
No. 103-322, § 60003(a)(14)) (emphasis
added); see also Holloway, 921 F.Supp. at 158.
Regardless of the actual intent of Congress in
adding this amendment, the practical effect of
adding this requirement is to severely limit the
scope of conduct covered by the statute. The
addition of the heightened intent requirement
into the body of the carjacking statute limits
federal jurisdiction over all carjacking offenses
to only those in which death or serious bodily
harm was intended. Notwithstanding that such
a result was unintended, the Court declines any
invitation to redraft the statute--that is a task
better left to the legislature. Thus, the sole issue
this Court must decide is whether the "specific
intent to kill," as now reflected in 18 U.S.C. §
2119, encompasses a conditional intent, as
defined by Judge Gleeson in his instruction to
the jury.
B. Judge Gleeson's Instruction
In his instruction to the jury, Judge Gleeson
charged, in relevant part
Evidence that the defendant intended to use a
gun to frighten the victims is not sufficient in
and of itself to prove an intent to kill or cause
serious bodily harm. It is, however, one of the
facts you may consider in determining whether
the government has met its burden.
You may also consider the fact that no victim
was actually killed or seriously injured when
you consider the evidence or lack of evidence
as to the defendant's intent.
In some cases, intent is conditional. That is, a
defendant may intend to engage in certain
conduct only if a certain event occurs.
In this case, the government contends that the
defendant intended to cause death or serious
bodily harm if the alleged victims had refused
to turn over their cars. If you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had such
an intent, the government has satisfied this
element of the offense
If you find that the co-defendant, Vernon
Lennon, acted with the intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury, that is not sufficient.
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You must find that the defendant shared in
that intent before you can conclude that this
element has been satisfied.
Holloway argues that the above instruction was
erroneous because it allowed the jury to convict
him based on lesser mental state than is required
by the carjacking statute. Holloway contends
that the plain meaning of "specific intent to kill"
does not include the lesser mental state of
"conditional intent," because a conditional intent
to kill is no more than a state of mind where
death is a foreseeable event and, as such, is
equivalent to a mental state of recklessness or
depraved indifference. Holloway contends that
such a lesser mental state plainly does not satisfy
the intent requirement of the carjacking statute.
The Court agrees that a conditional intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm and "reckless
indifference" both involve foreseeability;
however, conditional intent requires a much
more culpable mental state. A carjacker who
plans to kill or use deadly force on a victim in
the event that his victim fails to comply with his
demands has engaged in willful and deliberate
consideration of his actions. Under these
circumstances, death is more than merely
foreseeable, it is fully contemplated and planned
for. Such a mental state is clearly
distinguishable from the characterization of
conditional intent advanced by Holloway, which
only has the carjacker aware of a risk of death of
which he chooses to disregard.
Holloway further argues that the Supreme
Court case, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107
S.Ct. 1676 (1987), forecloses the inclusion of
conditional intent within the scope of an
Furthermore, the inclusion of a conditional
intent to harm within the definition of specific
intent to harm is a well-established principle of
criminal common law. In his decision denying
Holloway's Rule 33 motion, Judge Gleeson cited
ordinary specific intent to kill. In Tison, co-
defendants Raymond and Ricky Tison planned
an armed jail break to free their father, Gary
Tison, and another inmate from the Arizona
State Prison. After a successful escape from
prison, a flat tire in their getaway car led to the
stopping and theft of a family's car in the desert
outside of Flagstaff, Arizona. The defendants
witnessed their father brutally execute the family
who had been in the car. The defendants were
found guilty of aggravated felony-murder and
sentenced to death. In the context of reviewing
a collateral attack on the imposition of the death
penalty, the Supreme Court found that under the
factual circumstances presented, the defendants
lacked a "specific intent to kill," and at most had
a culpable mental state of reckless indifference
to human life. Id. at 152, 107 S.Ct. at 1685.
Holloway seizes on this language, characterizing
conditional intent as an analogous mental state
to that ascribed to the defendants in Tison.
Holloway argies that, at best, the proof shows
that he and Lennon shared a conditional intent
to kill, which only meant that it was foreseeable
that death could result from their various
carjackings.
The facts of Tison are plainly distinguishable
from the case at bar. In Tison some violence
was foreseeable to the defendants in effecting
the jailbreak, however, the murders for which
the defendants were convicted were precipitated
by a completely unplanned event, the flat tire in
the desert. Thus, while it may have been
foreseeable to them that death would occur in
the course of the escape, the murders that
flowed from their breakdown in the desert were
not the result of a willful and deliberate plan.
to state criminal law authority as support for his
conditional intent charge. See Holloway, 921
F.Supp. at 159 (citing W.R. LaFave and A.W.
Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 28 at
200 (1972), Model Penal Code § 2.02(6)
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(American Law Institute); People v. Connors,
253 Ill. 266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912); Hairston v.
Mississippi, 54 Miss. 689 (1877)). Following his
decision, the Third Circuit in United States v.
Anderson cited to Judge Gleeson's opinion with
approval, finding that "conditional intent" was
included within the specific intent required by
the carjacking statute. 108 F.3d at 483, 485.
The Anderson court also cited to additional
authority confirming this principle of criminal
law, including the incorporation of the doctrine
of conditional intent into some state penal codes.
See Del.Code Ann. tit. 11 § 254 (1996) ("The
fact that a defendant's intention was conditional
is immaterial unless the condition negatives the
harm or evil sought to be prevented by the
statute defining the offense."); 18 Pa.
Cons.Stat. Ann. 18 § 302(f) (West 1997)
("Requirement of intent satisfied if intent is
conditional--When a particular intent is an
element of an offense, the element is established
although such intent is conditional, unless the
condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense.");
Haw.Rev.Stat. § 702-209 (1996) ("When a
particular intent is necessary to establish an
element of an offense, it is immaterial that such
intent was conditional unless the condition
negatives the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law prohibiting the offense.").
This Court also finds ample persuasive
authority supporting the inclusion of conditional
intent within the scope of the specific intent
requirement. See People v. Thompson, 93
Cal.App.2d 780, 209 P.2d 819, 820 (1949);
People v. Henry, 356 Ill. 141, 190 N.E. 361,
361-62 (1934); Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d
762, 765 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992); Gregory v. State,
628 P.2d 384, 386 (Okla.Crim.App.1981).
Furthermore, and most importantly,
incorporating conditional intent within the
specific intent language of the carjacking statute
comports with a reasonable interpretation of the
legislative purpose of the statute. The
alternative interpretation would have the federal
carjacking statute covering only those
carjackings in which the carjacker's sole and
unconditional purpose at the time he committed
the carjacking was to kill or maim the victim.
Such an interpretation would dramatically limit
the reach of the carjacking statute. "It is well-
established that 'in expounding a statute, we
must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions
of the whole law, and its object and policy.' "
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d
Cir.1995) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549,
1554 (1987)) A statute should not be literally
applied if it results in an interpretation clearly at
odds with the intent of the drafters. See id.
While the Court cannot and should not rewrite
a poorly drafted statute, it has an obligation to
interpret a statute so as to give it reasonable
meaning.
After reviewing the substantial body of state
law addressing this issue, and the clear
legislative purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the
Court finds that an intent to kill or cause serious
bodily harm conditioned on whether the victim
relinquishes his or her car is sufficient to fulfill
the intent requirement set forth in the federal
carjacking statute As such, we accept the well-
reasoned opinion of the court below, and hold
that Judge Gleeson did not err when he
instructed the jury on conditional intent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
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